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JOHN F. O'CONNOR*
[Jiudges are not given the task of running the Army.... The military
constitutes a specialized community governed by a separate disci-
pline from that of the civilian. Orderly government requires that the
judiciary be as scrupulous not to interfere with legitimate Army mat-
ters as the Army must be scrupulous not to intervene in judicial
matters.
Justice Robert H. Jackson'
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I. INTRODUCTION
On the evening of December 12, 1988, Christopher L. Fay, a pri-
vate in the United States Army, went to his off-duty job as a cab driver
* Captain, United States Marine Corps. B.A., University of Rochester; M.S.Sc., Syracuse
University; J.D., University of Maryland School of Law. Captain O'Connor is a judge advocate
stationed at Camp Pendleton, California. The views expressed in this Article are those of the
author only, and do not reflect the official policy of the Marine Corps, the Department of the
Navy, or the Department of Defense. The author wishes to thank Sean Fink, Sam Cooke, Robert
Terwilliger, and Jason Hart for their contributions to this Article.
1. Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 93-94 (1953).
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in Killeen, Texas.2 At about 8:00 p.m. that night, he was dispatched to
take a passenger from the Handy Grocery Store in Killeen to Fort Hood,
a nearby Army base.3 Fay picked up his passenger, Dwight J. Loving,
who directed him to drive to a secluded part of Fort Hood, where Loving
then robbed Fay at gunpoint.4 After Fay gave Loving the money he had,
Loving shot Fay in the back of the head.5 Seeing the blood "gushing
out" the back of Fay's head, Loving shot Fay a second time in the head
and left him there to die.6 About fifteen minutes later, with the same
plan in mind, Loving called for a second cab to take him from Fort Hood
back to Killeen. Similarly, Loving directed the cab driver, Bobby
Sharbino, to a secluded part of Killeen, where Loving robbed and killed
him with a gunshot to the head.7
Later that evening, Loving went to a nightclub with his girlfriend.
Convinced that a patron was staring at her, Loving brandished his pistol
in the club, but accidentally dropped it, causing the gun to discharge
inside the club.' Loving and his girlfriend hurriedly left the club and
hailed a taxi. After having the driver, Howard Harrison, drop his girl-
friend at her home in Killeen, Loving displayed his gun and directed
Harrison to a deserted part of town.9 Loving then, as he had twice
before that evening, demanded that the cab driver turn over all the
money in his possession."° After Harrison gave Loving about $94.00,
Loving "jerked Harrison's head around and told him to open his
mouth."'1 Believing he was about to be shot, Harrison grabbed for the
gun and a struggle ensued. Harrison ended up with the gun and tried to
shoot Loving, but the gun would not fire. Eventually, Harrison escaped
on foot and gave a full report to the police, including a description of his
assailant.'2 Loving was arrested the next day and, after initially denying
any involvement in the crimes, eventually confessed to murdering Fay
and Sharbino, and to robbing all three cab drivers.' 3
Loving was tried for the offenses involving the three cab drivers, as
well as for two convenience store robberies that occurred a day earlier.
The evidence of Loving's guilt was overwhelming. He was convicted of
2. See United States v. Loving, 41 M.J. 213, 229 (C.A.A.F. 1994).
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 230.
13. Id.
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the premeditated and felony-murders of Fay and Sharbino, of robbing all
three cab drivers, and of robbing the two convenience stores.14 The
findings of guilt were unanimous as to felony-murder of Fay, and as to
the premeditated and felony-murder of Sharbino, making Loving eligi-
ble for the death penalty.15 Loving was convicted of the premeditated
murder of Fay by a non-unanimous vote.16 The governing law required
only a two-thirds concurrence to convict Loving of the premeditated
murder of Fay, but the lack of unanimity did not make Loving death-
eligible based on that offense. 7 The jury, after deliberating on sentence,
unanimously determined that the accused should be put to death.1 8
The senseless and cold-hearted character of Loving's crimes sadly
resembles many of the other death penalty cases in modern American
jurisprudence. However, there is one omitted fact that makes Loving's
case extraordinarily unique, and something that has not been seen in
over thirty-five years-Dwight J. Loving was a private in the United
States Army at the time of his crimes. While Loving could have been
tried in civilian courts for his crimes, he was not; his fate was instead
decided by a court-martial administered by the United States Army.' 9
That Loving was tried by court-martial is important for several reasons.
First, the Fifth Amendment guarantees persons facing the death penalty
the right to a grand jury indictment.2 ° The Fifth Amendment, however,
explicitly excludes "cases arising in the land or naval forces" from the
grand jury right.2 Thus, while Loving did have the right to a formal
pretrial investigation of the charges against him,22 he did not receive, nor
14. Id. at 231.
15. See id.; R. CT. MARTIAL 1004(b)(4), MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL (1995) [hereinafter
R.C.M.] (providing that the death penalty may be adjudged upon unanimous findings of guilt to
death-eligible offenses such as premeditated murder and felony-murder).
16. See Loving, 41 M.J. at 231.
17. See R.C.M. 921(c)(2)(B) (requiring two-thirds concurrence for a finding of guilty in non-
death penalty offenses).
18. See Loving, 41 M.J. at 232.
19. See id. at 231.
20. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment provides in pertinent part: "No person
shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or
indictment of a Grand Jury except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia,
when in actual service in time of War or public danger; ..... Id.
21. Id. While the Fifth Amendment could be read as denying a grand jury right only for
courts-martial conducted "in time of War, or public danger," the Supreme Court has held that the
quoted language only modifies that part of the Fifth Amendment pertaining to the militia. See
Johnson v. Sayre, 158 U.S. 109, 114 (1895). The construction adopted by the Court comports
with the Framers' intention to limit the exception only to persons subject to military law, which
would include land and naval forces, as well as members of the militia in actual service. See id.;
Gordon D. Henderson, Courts-Martial and the Constitution: The Original Understanding, 71
HARv. L. REv. 293, 304 n.78 (1957-1958).
22. See UNWIF. CODE OF MIL. JUST., art. 32, 10 U.S.C. § 832 (a) (1994) (creating the right to a
pretrial investigation of charges before those charges may be referred to a general court-martial,
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did he have a right to receive, a grand jury indictment. Second, Loving
did not have a right to a trial by a jury of his peers.23 Instead, he had a
choice between being tried by a panel comprised entirely of military
officers, or by a panel of military officers and enlisted persons, with at
least one-third of the panel being enlisted. 4 Loving elected to be tried
by a panel of military officers. Finally, by virtue of his military status,
Loving was subject to different rights on appeal. His first level of
appeal was to the Court of Criminal Appeals, a body comprised of
senior Army officers, typically colonels and civilian lawyers.25 That
court affirmed Loving's conviction and sentence in two separate opin-
ions in 1992.26 Loving's next level of appeal was to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, a body of five civilian judges
appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate for fifteen-year
terms.2 7 That court affirmed the findings and sentence in 1994.28 Lov-
ing's final avenue of appeal was through petition to the United States
Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. The Court granted Loving's peti-
tion2 9 and unanimously affirmed his sentence to death.30 Thus, Dwight
J. Loving stands as the first soldier in over thirty-five years to be sen-
tenced to death by the court-martial and to have had his sentence
affirmed at every level of appeal. In all likelihood, he will be the first
soldier since 1961 to receive the death penalty based upon the sentence
of a military court-martial.3"
The Supreme Court's grant of certiorari in Loving was extremely
limited. In military law, the President, through the Manual for Courts-
Martial,3" establishes the procedure for military courts-martial, includ-
the only court-martial empowered to adjudge the death penalty or confinement in excess of six
months).
23. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (creating the right to an impartial jury in all criminal
prosecutions). But see Whelchel v. McDonald, 340 U.S. 122, 127 (1950) (holding that the explicit
exception of courts-martial from the Fifth Amendment's grand jury right also applied to the right
to a jury trial contained in the Sixth Amendment); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 123
(1866) (same).
24. See UNIF. CODE OF MIL. JUST., art. 25(c)(1).
25. See id. art. 66. At the time of Loving's appeal, the intermediate military appellate courts
were called Courts of Military Review. In 1994, those courts were renamed the Courts of
Criminal Appeals. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, Pub. L. No.
103-337, § 924(b)(1), 108 Stat. 2663, 2831 (1994).
26. See U.S. v. Loving, 34 M.J. 956, 970 (A.C.M.R. 1992); 34 M.J. 1065, 1069 (A.C.M.R.
1992).
27. See UNIF. CODE OF MIL. JUST., art. 67.
28. See U.S. v. Loving, 41 M.J. 213, 300 (C.A.A.F. 1994).
29. U.S. v. Loving, 116 S. Ct. 39 (1995).
30. See Loving v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1737, 1751 (1996).
31. See Richard A. Serrano, Last Soldier to Die at Leavenworth Hanged in an April Storm,
L.A. TIMES, July 12, 1994, at A14.
32. See R.C.M., at Rules 1004, 1207.
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ing the enumeration of aggravating factors authorizing imposition of the
death penalty.33 The Court granted certiorari to consider whether it vio-
lated the principle of separation of powers for the President, rather than
Congress, to establish the aggravating factors. 34 The Court held that the
Constitution's grant to Congress of the power "to make Rules for the
Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces"35 permitted
Congress to delegate to the President, with minimal guidance, the duty
to promulgate the military's capital sentencing scheme.36 The result in
Loving was not unexpected; the only real surprise was that all nine Jus-
tices agreed that there was no violation of the separation of powers doc-
trine. 37  Although Loving was a -separation of powers case, its most
interesting aspect might be the Justices' discussion of Congress' author-
ity to establish the jurisdiction of courts-martial.
From the founding of the Republic until 1969, the courts placed no
constraints on Congress' authority to fix the subject-matter jurisdiction
of courts-martial. In 1969, however, the Supreme Court changed course
and held in O'Callahan v. Parker38 that Congress lacked the power to
create court-martial jurisdiction over offenses that were not connected to
the accused's military service. 39 The O'Callahan principle survived
eighteen years until the Court explicitly overruled it in Solorio v. United
States,4° where the Court held that Congress could establish court-mar-
tial jurisdiction for any offense committed while the accused ser-
vicemember was on active duty in the armed forces.4
The Solorio rule-that there were no constitutional limits on Con-
gress' power to set the subject-matter jurisdiction of courts-martial-
33. See R.C.M., at Rules 1004, 1004, 1207.
34. See Loving, 116 S. Ct. at 1742 (the Court also considered the question of whether granting
President the power to establish the aggravating factor violated the Eighth Amendment).
35. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
36. Loving, 116 S. Ct. at 1751. The Court noted that because the Constitution grants the
President considerable powers over the military and foreign affairs, Congress may delegate
regulation of military matters to the President without the same level of statutory guidance that
might be necessary to delegate regulatory power to an entity not recognized in the Constitution as
having some cognizance over the subject matter. Id. at 1750; cf. Mistretta v. United States, 488
U.S. 361, 374-79 (1989) (upholding congressional delegation to newly-created United States
Sentencing Commission only because of explicit statutory constraints on agency discretion). For
a fine discussion of the Court's decision in Loving, see Cody M. Weston, Note, United States v.
Loving: The Resurrection of Military Capital Punishment, 76 OR. L. REv. - (forthcoming May
1998).
37. Loving, 116 S. Ct. at 1751. The Court's recent separation of powers cases, such as
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988), and Mistretta, 488 U.S. 361 (1989), demonstrated deep
theoretical differences among the Justices on the issue of delegation of legislative powers.
38. 395 U.S. 258 (1969), overruled by Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435 (1987).
39. See id. at 272-73.
40. 483 U.S. 435 (1987).
41. See id. at 440-41.
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had, until recently, appeared unassailable. The continued viability of
Solorio was brought into question, however, by Justice Stevens' concur-
ring opinion in Loving.42 In the opinion joined by Justices Souter, Gins-
burg, and Breyer, Justice Stevens expressly noted that he was voting to
affirm the death penalty in Loving only because he was convinced from
the record that the crimes were service-connected.43 According to Jus-
tice Stevens:
The question whether a "service connection" requirement should
obtain in capital cases is an open one both because Solorio was not a
capital case, and because Solorio's review of the historical materials
would seem to undermine any contention that a military tribunal's
power to try capital offenses must be as broad as its power to try non-
capital ones.4
Thus, it appears that at least four Justices are poised to hold that Con-
gress lacks the authority to give courts-martial jurisdiction over capital
cases where the offense charged is not related to the accused's military
service.
The questions raised by Justice Stevens' concurrence in Loving are
not the typical issues of subject-matter jurisdiction. This is not a ques-
tion of whether Congress has conferred jurisdiction upon courts-martial
to try capital cases where there is no service connection; Congress
clearly has done so.45 Justice Stevens' concurrence instead challenges
whether Congress can grant such jurisdiction pursuant to its powers
under Article I of the Constitution.
Part I of this article will undertake an analysis of the historical prac-
tice which forms the foundation of Justice Stevens' argument in Loving.
Particular attention will be given to the availability of the death penalty
under American military law for common-law offenses such as murder
and rape. A review of the historical materials makes clear that Congress
had, until 1951, generally granted courts-martial narrower jurisdiction
over capital crimes than it had over non-capital offenses. Nevertheless,
the manner in which Congress expanded court-martial jurisdiction over
the years does not lead to the conclusion that Congress believed it lacked
42. See Loving, 116 S. Ct. at 1751 (Stevens, J., concurring).
43. See id. The factors in Loving that Justice Stevens found service-connected were that the
first victim was an active duty servicemember moonlighting as a cab driver, and that the second
victim was a retired servicemember who had picked Loving up at his barracks aboard Fort Hood,
Texas. See id.
44. Id.
45. UNIF. CODE OF MIL. JUST., art. 18, 10 U.S.C. § 818 (1994) ("[G]eneral courts-martial
have jurisdiction to try persons subject to this chapter for any offense made punishable by this
chapter and may, under such limitations as the President may prescribe, adjudge any punishment
not forbidden by this chapter, including the penalty of death when specifically authorized by this
chapter.").
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the power to eliminate subject-matter constraints on capital offenses.
Part II will examine the appropriate interpretation of Congress' constitu-
tional power to set court-martial jurisdiction. The pertinent provision-
Article I, Section 8, Clause 14-imposes no literal restrictions on Con-
gress' power to regulate the armed forces, and a review of the Framers'
intent supports an interpretation that Clause 14 is a plenary grant of
power to Congress. Finally, Part III, examines Supreme Court precedent
bearing on Clause 14 of Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution. It
becomes clear, from one hundred fifty years of precedent on the matter,
that the Court would have to ignore and/or overrule an immense body of
case law in order to adopt Justice Stevens' view that Congress' power to
create jurisdiction over capital offenses is narrower than its ability to do
so for non-capital offenses. This examination of historical practice, the
Framers' intent, and Supreme Court precedent, leads to one inescapable
conclusion-though Congress has, at times, created a narrow death pen-
alty jurisdiction, Congress was, and is, free at any time to change course
and disregard its previous practice vis-a-vis courts-martial. Article I of
the Constitution grants Congress, not the judiciary, the power to govern
the armed forces, and that power encompasses the authority to establish
and regulate courts-martial. So long as Congress' court-martial regula-
tions do not violate other constitutional provisions, such as the Fifth
Amendment's guarantee of due process, the judiciary is without power
to strike them down or otherwise modify them.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF COURT-MARTIAL JURISDICTION
In the early days of the Republic, the armed forces were not nearly
as integrated as they are today. In fact, Congress created two distinct
systems of military law-one for the Army and one for the Navy-until
the passage of the Uniform Code of Military Justice in 1950. The Navy,
owing to the long tradition of dictatorial power by ship captains, was not
highly regulated by Congress. As a result, there was little written naval
law before 1950, with the naval justice system being based mostly on
the ancient traditions of the law of the sea. On the other hand, military
law for the Army was established by positive law enacted by Congress,
and was often revised as exigencies required. The Army's military law,
as enacted by Congress, was promulgated in a series of statutes known
as the Army Articles of War. Congress' legislation of military law, from
the offenses made punishable by death to ancillary provisions relating to
the imposition of the death penalty, gives a clear picture of the develop-
ment of military death penalty jurisprudence and of Congress' view of
its role in that development.
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A. The Army Articles of War
1. THE 1775 ARTICLES OF WAR
American courts-martial predate the Constitution; indeed, the colo-
nists provided for courts-martial before the colonies won their indepen-
dence from Great Britain.46 Of course, while the colonies were under
British control, the British Articles of War governing courts-martial
applied to Americans fighting under the British flag. The first truly
American provision for courts-martial was the Articles of War of
1775. 47 Those Articles, applying only to the governance of the Conti-
nental Army, were prepared by a committee consisting of founding
fathers George Washington, Philip Schuyler, Silas Deane, Thomas
Cushing, and Joseph Hewes, and were adopted by the Second Continen-
tal Congress on June 30, 1775.48 Those Articles were revised in
November of 1775, 49 and replaced the next year by the Articles of War
of 1776.50 The 1775 Articles, as originally enacted, authorized the death
penalty for only three offenses, all purely military in nature: shamefully
abandoning one's post,5 I disclosing the watch-word or giving a false
watch-word5 2 and compelling a senior officer to surrender his command
to the enemy. 3 The November revision to the 1775 Articles added two
other purely military capital offenses: treacherous correspondence with
the enemy,54 and causing or joining in mutiny or sedition. Thus, the
first Articles of War had an extremely limited class of death penalty
offenses, and each of those offenses was a military offense for which
there was no analogous civilian crime.
2. THE 1776 ARTICLES OF WAR
The 1776 Code, drafted by a committee comprised of John Adams,
Thomas Jefferson, John Rutledge, James Wilson, and R.R. Livingston,
greatly enlarged the class of capital crimes cognizable under military
law. Where the 1775 Articles had limited the death penalty to three
purely military offenses, the 1776 Articles permitted capital punishment
46. See WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 47 (2d ed. 1920).
47. Articles of War of 1775, reprinted in WINTHROP, supra note 46, at 953.
48. See WINTHROP, supra note 46, at 21.
49. See Additional Articles of War of Nov. 7, 1775, reprinted in WINTHROP, supra note 46, at
959-60.
50. Articles of War of 1776, reprinted in WINTHROP, supra note 46, at 961.
51. See Articles of War of 1775, art. 25, reprinted in WINTHROP, supra note 46, at 955.
52. See id. art. 26, at 955.
53. See id. art. 31, at 956.
54. See Additional Articles of War of Nov. 7, 1775, art. 1, reprinted in WINTHROP, supra note
46, at 959.
55. See id. art. 5, at 959.
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for sixteen different crimes. Like the 1775 Code, the crimes punishable
by death under the 1776 Articles tended to be purely military offenses,
including such crimes as mutiny and sedition, desertion, aiding the
enemy, and sleeping on post.56 However, the 1776 Articles added two
capital offenses that although not purely military in nature, would have a
direct effect on good order and discipline. The first of these offenses
was striking or offering violence against a superior officer in the execu-
tion of his office.5 7 While the military necessity of this article is appar-
ent, such an offense generally would have been cognizable under
civilian law as an assault and/or battery. But, the committee recognized
that this type of assaultive behavior as particularly dangerous in the
military context. Assault on superior officers could destroy unit disci-
pline, justifying court-martial jurisdiction over an offense triable by
civilian courts.
The second capital offense not purely military in character was
committing violence to any person bringing provisions or other neces-
saries into camp.58 Again, this article prohibited a crime of violence that
certainly would be prohibited by local law, whether it is assault, battery,
or even murder. But, much like assaults against superior officers, there
existed an obvious military interest in safeguarding camp suppliers. At
the time of these amendments, an army in the field relied heavily upon
supplies provided by local civilian merchants and by civilians who fol-
lowed the army from camp to camp.59 A commander who could not
guarantee the safety of his camp followers faced the possibility of not
receiving necessary supplies. By giving commanders the latitude to
punish soldiers menacing civilian resuppliers, instead of requiring resort
to the civilian courts, the 1776 Articles gave commanders the tools nec-
essary to guarantee the availability of ammunition, foodstuffs, and other
supplies.
Apart from creating new capital military offenses, the 1776 Articles
introduced a provision (one that would remain in effect until 1951) that
56. The complete list of capital offenses under the 1776 Articles is mutiny and sedition (§ 2,
art. 3); failure to suppress mutiny and sedition (§ 2, art. 4); striking a superior officer in the
execution of his duties (§ 2, art. 5); desertion (§ 6, art. 1); sleeping on post (§ 13, art. 6); causing a
false alarm in camp (§ 13, art. 9); causing violence to persons bringing provisions into camp
(§ 13, art. 11); misbehavior before the enemy (§ 13, art. 12); inducing others to misbehave before
the enemy (§ 13, art. 13); casting away arms or ammunition (§ 13, art. 14); disclosing the watch-
word (§ 13, art. 15); forcing a safeguard (§ 13, art. 17); aiding the enemy (§ 13, art. 18);
correspondence with the enemy (§ 13, art. 19); abandoning post in search of plunder (§ 13, art.
21); and subordinate compelling surrender (§ 13, art. 22). See Articles of War of 1776, reprinted
in WINTHROP, supra note 46, at 961.
57. See id. § 2, art. 5, at 962.
58. See id. § 13, art. 11, at 966.
59. See WILLIAM C. DE HART, OBSERVATIONS ON MILITARY LAW AND THE CONSTITUTION
AND PRACTICE OF COURTS MARTIAL 22-25 (1859).
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would go straight to the heart of the overlapping capital jurisdiction of
military and civilian courts. 60 The turnover provision of the 1776 Arti-
cles required military commanders to deliver to civilian authorities any
soldier accused of committing serious common-law crimes against the
person or property of an American citizen. 61 By its terms, this article
only required a commander to turn over a soldier so accused "upon
application duly made by or in behalf of the party or parties injured. 62
The intent behind this provision and its bearing on court-martial juris-
diction has long been debated. Colonel Winthrop, author of the defini-
tive treatise on military law and called "the Blackstone of military law"
by the Supreme Court,6 3 asserted that this article was intended to empha-
size the subordination of military jurisdiction to civilian jurisdiction in
time of peace. 64 However, as Winthrop recognized, this subordination
of military jurisdiction is extremely nuanced. Given that the superiority
of civilian jurisdiction is triggered upon application by the victims, it is
evident the turnover article was not enacted in order to protect the rights
of the accused soldier. For instance, the 1776 Articles of War made
violence upon a camp supplier a capital offense; 65 therefore, if a member
of the Continental Army killed someone bringing provisions or other
necessaries into camp, it would have been a capital offense in violation
of Section 13, Article 11 of the 1776 Articles of War.6 6 That offense
also would have been triable as murder in the civilian courts. If the
victim's family, or presumably the civilian authorities, were satisfied
that the offense would be handled adequately by the military courts, then
they could allow the court-martial to proceed. If the civilian victims
preferred a civilian trial, for whatever reason, then they could apply to
60. See Frederick B. Wiener, Courts-Martial and the Bill of Rights: The Original Practice, 72
HARv. L. REV. 1, 12 (1958).
61. See Articles of War of 1776, § 10, art. 1, reprinted in WINTHROP, supra note 46, at 964-
65. The article reads in pertinent part:
Whenever any officer or soldier shall be accused of a capital crime, or of having
used violence, or committed any offense against the persons or property of the good
people of any of the United American States, such as is punishable by the known
laws of the land, the commanding officer and officers of every regiment, troop, or
party, to which the person or persons so accused shall belong, are hereby required,
upon application duly made by or in behalf of the party or parties injured, to use his
utmost endeavors to deliver over such accused person or persons to the civil
magistrate; and likewise to be aiding and assisting to the officers of justice in
apprehending and securing the person or persons so accused, in order to bring them
to trial.
Id. at 964.
62. Id.
63. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 19 n.38 (1957) (plurality opinion).
64. See WINTHROP, supra note 46, at 691.
65. See supra notes 58-59.
66. See supra note 58.
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the accused's commanding officer, who was obliged to hand over the
soldier.
In fact, this very phenomenon of forum-shopping by a victim can
be seen in the case of Ex parte Mason,67 where the military courts took
cognizance of a case that, upon application, rightfully would have been
tried in civilian court. In Mason, the accused was an Army sergeant on
duty as a guard at the Washington, D.C. jail which housed the notorious
Charles J. Guiteau, who was being held for assassinating President Gar-
field.68 Sergeant Mason, perhaps acting out of a misguided sense of
patriotism, attempted to kill Guiteau by firing his musket into Guiteau's
cell.69 Mason was tried and convicted by a court-martial even though
his offense, attempted murder, plainly was triable under local law.7°
Although Mason was not charged with a capital offense, the crime trig-
gered the turnover provision because the charged offense was a crime
"against the person or property of any citizen of the United States. 71
The Court rejected Mason's claim that this article affected the jurisdic-
tion of the accused's court-martial:
It is not pretended that any application was ever made under this Arti-
cle for the surrender of Mason to the civil authorities for trial. So far
as it appears, the person injured by the offense committed was satis-
fied to have the offender dealt with by the military tribunals. The
choice of the tribunal by which he is to be tried has not been given to
the offender .... As the proper steps were not taken to have him
proceeded against by the civil authorities, it was the clear duty of the
military to bring him to trial under that jurisdiction.72
Thus, the subordination of military jurisdiction was not intended to pro-
tect the rights of the accused, nor was it a recognition of the substantive
superiority of civilian tribunals. Rather, this article was designed pri-
marily to protect local citizens from marauding soldiers and to prevent
military commanders from shielding their soldiers from punishment for
their crimes against the civilian populace.73 As one court characterized
67. 105 U.S. 696 (1881).
68. See id. at 697.
69. See id.
70. Id.
71. Articles of War of 1874, § 1342, art. 59, tit. XIV, ch. 5, 18 Stat. 229, 235, reprinted in
WINTHROP, supra note 46, at 990; see also Articles of War of 1776 § 13, art. 11, reprinted in
WINTHROP, supra note 46, at 966 (using similar language).
72. Mason, 105 U.S. at 699.
73. As Colonel Winthrop stated:
[N]otwithstanding this independence of the military power within its peculiar field,
the further principle is uniformly asserted of the subordination, in time of peace and
on common ground, of the military authority to the civil, and of the consequent
amenability of military persons, in their civil capacity, to the civil jurisdiction, for
breaches of the criminal law of the land.
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it, this article was intended "to aid the civil authorities in the administra-
tion of justice, and to place it out of the power of a criminal to escape
the just civil penalties of his acts, by entering the military service or
claiming its protection when in it." 74
Thus, in relation to the death penalty, the 1776 Articles can be seen
as a departure from the 1775 Articles in three ways. First, the 1776 Arti-
cles greatly expanded the number of purely military offenses subject to
the punishment by death. That result is not overly surprising, consider-
ing that the committee that drafted the 1776 Articles previously had
been assigned "to consider what is proper to be done with persons giving
intelligence to the enemy or supplying them with provisions. '75 The
second departure is more subtle, but more important for the purposes of
this article. The 1775 Articles of War permitted the death penalty for
only purely military offenses. The 1776 Articles expanded death penalty
jurisdiction from purely military offenses to crimes that, while cogniza-
ble under civilian law, were of such importance to the readiness of the
Continental Army that the drafters thought it advisable to have courts-
martial try them. Finally, the 1776 Articles gave victims of serious
crimes committed by soldiers the right to demand that a civilian court
try the case. This provision did not, however, demonstrate the superior-
ity of civilian jurisdiction; rather, it was designed to ensure that a soldier
could not shield himself from punishment for his crimes by virtue of his
service in the Army.
3. FROM THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL WAR
The 1776 Articles remained in force without any change to death
penalty jurisdiction through the adoption of the Constitution. Article I
of the Constitution provides that "Congress shall have the power ... To
WINTHROP, supra note 46, at 691 (emphasis added). Misconduct by soldiers against the civilian
populace was considered a significant problem by Congress. See Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U.S.
509, 513 (1878) ("It is a matter well known that the march even of an army not hostile is often
accompanied with acts of violence and pillage by straggling parties of soldiers, which the most
rigid discipline is hardly able to prevent."). This desire to protect local citizens from the crimes of
an army on the march also can be seen in section 13, article 16 of the 1776 Articles, which read in
pertinent part:
[W]hoever shall commit any waste or spoil, either in walks of trees, parks, warrens,
fish-ponds, houses or gardens, corn-fields, enclosures or meadows, or shall mali-
ciously destroy any property whatsoever belonging to the good people of the United
States .... shall (besides such penalties as they are liable to by law) be punished
according to the nature and degree of the offence, by the judgment of a regimental
or general court-martial.
Articles of War of 1776, § XII, art. 16, reprinted in WINTHROP, supra note 46, at 967.
74. Ex parte McRoberts, 16 Iowa 600, 603 (1864), quoted in WINTHROP, supra note 43, at
691.
75. 1 JOUR. CONT. CONG. 365 (1776), quoted in WINTHROP, supra note 46, at 22.
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make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval
Forces."'76 That provision became the authority under which Congress
enacted subsequent Articles of War, making it clear that Congress,
rather than the President, would have cognizance over regulating court-
martial practice.77 The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution also explic-
itly recognized the existence of courts-martial by excepting "cases aris-
ing in the land and naval forces" from the Fifth Amendment right to a
grand jury indictment for capital and infamous crimes.78 Pursuant to its
explicit power to regulate the armed forces, the new Congress reenacted
the 1776 Articles of War in 1789, 79 and periodically thereafter.80 In
1806, Congress revamped the 1776 Articles and enacted a new Code.81
The 1806 Articles of War did not effect any change whatsoever in the
substantive jurisdiction of courts-martial. Much like the 1776 Articles,
the 1806 Articles of War made the death penalty applicable to a variety
of purely military offenses.82 It also authorized the death penalty for the
same two arguably common-law offenses for which death was author-
ized under 1776 Articles: offering violence against a superior officer in
the execution of his office,83 and violence to persons supplying the
camp.84
In fact, the first substantive change to the death penalty jurisdiction
of the 1776 Articles of War occurred a full eighty-seven years later
when Congress, at the height of the Civil War, authorized court-martial
jurisdiction over a bevy of common-law offenses .8  The 1863 revision
authorized courts-martial to try, in time of war or rebellion, cases of
soldiers charged with "murder, assault and battery with an intent to com-
mit murder, manslaughter, mayhem, wounding by shooting or stabbing
76. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
77. See 1 WILLIAM W. CROSSKEY, POLrrIcs AND THE CONSTITUTION 412-13 (1953) (stating
that the purpose of art. I, § 8, cl. 14 was to remove any doubt that regulation of the land and naval
forces was to be vested in Congress rather than in the Executive).
78. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
79. See Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 25, § 4, 1 Stat. 95, 96.
80. See WNTHROP, supra note 46, at 23 & n.43 (listing subsequent reenactments of the
Articles).
81. See Articles of War of 1806, reprinted in WInrTHROP, supra note 46, at 976.
82. The purely military offenses punishable by death under the 1806 Articles were: mutiny
and sedition (art. 7); failure to suppress mutiny and sedition (art. 8); disobeying lawful commands
of a superior officer (art. 9); desertion (art. 20); advising another to desert (art. 23); sleeping on
post (art. 46); giving a false alarm in camp (art. 49); misbehavior before the enemy, shamefully
abandoning post, inciting others to shamefully abandon their post, casting away arms or
ammunition, and plundering (art. 52); disclosing the watchword (art. 53); forcing a safeguard (art.
55); giving comfort to the enemy (art. 56); correspondence with the enemy (art. 57); and
subordinate compelling surrender (art. 59). See id. at 976-81.
83. See id. art. 9, at 976-77.
84. See id. art. 51, at 980-81.
85. See Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 75, § 30, 12 Stat. 731, 736.
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with an intent to commit murder, robbery, arson, burglary, rape, assault
and battery with an intent to commit rape, and larceny."86 This grant of
jurisdiction marked the first time that Congress gave Army courts-mar-
tial jurisdiction over common-law crimes, which by their very nature did
not directly affect the good order and discipline of the military.87 This
statute further provided that the punishment for any soldier convicted of
these enumerated crimes "shall never be less than those inflicted by the
laws of the state, territory, or district in which they may have been com-
mitted."88 This language as to the authorized punishment is significant
for two reasons. First, by referencing the maximum punishment of the
jurisdiction where the crime occurred, it is clear that the local courts
need not have been rendered inoperable by the war or insurrection for
courts-martial to have jurisdiction over these offenses. The Supreme
Court made this point in the case of Coleman v. Tennessee.89 In that
case, Coleman, a Union soldier at the time of his offense, was sentenced
to death by a court-martial for an 1865 murder that took place in Ten-
nessee. 9° He subsequently escaped, was tried by a Tennessee state
court, and again sentenced to death.9' Coleman appealed his state court
death sentence on the grounds that the court lacked jurisdiction because
the 1863 Act gave courts-martial exclusive jurisdiction over murders
committed by soldiers in time of war. The Supreme Court rejected
Coleman's assertion, holding that the 1863 law did not give courts-mar-
tial exclusive jurisdiction, but created concurrent jurisdiction with that
exercised by any federal or state court.92 Thus, Congress did not design
the provision to replace civilian court jurisdiction when those courts
ceased to operate, but rather, designed it in recognition that, during time
of war, a military commander has a paramount interest in being able to
punish the criminal conduct of his soldiers, whether the crime has a
direct effect on unit discipline or not.
86. Id.
87. See WINTHROP, supra note 46, at 667. Because of the different character of naval service,
Congress had allowed naval courts-martial to try various common-law offenses much sooner than
that power was conferred upon Army courts-martial. See infra notes 107-28 and accompanying
text.
88. Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 75, § 30, 12 Stat. 731, 736.
89. 97 U.S. 509, 513 (1878).
90. See id. at 510-11.
91. See id. at 511.
92. See id. at 513-14. In the end, the Court reversed Coleman's state court conviction
because at the time of the offense, the state of Tennessee was at war against the United States.
The Court relied on the international law maxim that a soldier is not bound by the laws of the
enemy, even when he is in enemy territory. See id. at 515. Nevertheless, Coleman's victory in the
Supreme Court was truly bittersweet. In the last line of the Court's opinion, it suggested that
Coleman, having been sentenced to death by a general court-martial, be turned over to the Federal
Government to have his unexecuted death sentence carried out. See id. at 519-20.
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The second significant characteristic of the authorized punishment
for these common-law crimes is that it greatly expanded the death pen-
alty jurisdiction of courts-martial. If the local law made death the
mandatory punishment for any of the listed offenses, then the court-mar-
tial was required to adjudge a death sentence upon a conviction. 93
Moreover, a court-martial could sentence a soldier to death if local law
made death one of the authorized punishments. If the offense were not
committed in a state, such as in crimes committed in the District of
Columbia or at sea, the governing federal law in 1863 authorized courts-
martial to adjudge the death penalty for any common-law murder, rape,
or arson committed in time of war.94 Far from a quick-fix for the
problems caused by the Civil War, Congress never repealed the 1863
expansion of court-martial jurisdiction. To the contrary, Congress, since
1863, has repeatedly, albeit incrementally, expanded the jurisdiction of
courts-martial over common-law offenses.
4. THE 1916 ARTICLES OF WAR
The Articles of War were revised and reissued by Congress in
1874;91 however, that revision made no changes in the offenses punish-
able by the death penalty. The plethora of purely military offenses
remained from the 1776 Articles,9 6 including the offenses of striking an
officer and doing violence to civilians resupplying the camp (offenses
that, while not purely military in nature, have an obvious effect on unit
discipline and readiness). 97 Moreover, through Article 58, Congress
retained the 1863 provision granting courts-martial jurisdiction over sev-
eral common-law felonies in time of war (crimes possibly classified as
capital offenses depending on local law). 98
After 1863, the first substantive change in the death penalty juris-
diction of Army courts-martial occurred with the enactment of the Arti-
cles of War of 1916.99 Under the 1916 Articles, committing violence
upon persons bringing necessaries into camp, a capital offense under the
93. See WINTHROP, supra note 46, at 689.
94. See id. at 690.
95. Articles of War of 1874, tit. XIV, ch. 5, 18 Stat. 229, reprinted in WINTHROP, supra note
46, at 986.
96. See id. art. 22 (mutiny and sedition); art. 23 (failure to suppress mutiny or sedition); art.
39 (sleeping on post); art. 41 (giving a false alarm); art. 42 (misbehavior before the enemy); art.
43 (subordinate compelling surrender); art. 44 (disclosing the watch-word); art. 45 (giving
comfort to the enemy); art. 46 (correspondence with the enemy); art. 47 (desertion in time of war);
and art. 51 (advising another to desert in time of war), at 988-90.
97. See id. art. 21 (striking superior officer); art. 56 (violence to persons bringing necessaries
into camp), at 987, 990.
98. Id. art. 58, at 990.
99. Act of Aug. 29, 1916, ch. 418, § 1342, 39 Stat. 619, 650.
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1874 Articles, became a non-capital offense. 1°° Moreover, the 1916
Articles of War changed court-martial jurisdiction over common-law
felonies in several important ways. First, Congress gave courts-martial
unconditional jurisdiction over manslaughter, mayhem, arson, burglary,
robbery, larceny, embezzlement, perjury, assault with intent to commit a
felony, and assault with intent to commit bodily harm.1' Unlike the
1863 statute, jurisdiction over these offenses was not predicated on the
United States being at war. Congress also eliminated the requirement
that the punishment for these common-law crimes match the punishment
in force in the locality where the crime occurred. Instead, Congress pro-
vided that all of these offenses were to be punished "as a court-martial
may direct,"'0 2 meaning that these offenses were to be non-capital
offenses.' 0 3 As for murder and rape, Article 92 of the 1916 Articles
expressly made those crimes capital offenses, without regard to the law
in the community where the crime occurred.""° The only limitation on
the exercise of court-martial jurisdiction over murder and rape was that a
court-martial could not exercise jurisdiction over a murder or rape com-
mitted within any state or the District of Columbia in time of peace.'o 5
Thus, while the 1863 statute had limited jurisdiction over the capital
offenses of murder and rape to wartime, the 1916 Articles created court-
martial jurisdiction over wartime murder and rape, as well as to peace-
time murder and rape committed outside the continental United States.
Article 92 was reenacted without change in 1920.106 In 1948, Con-
gress amended Article 92, tinkering with its authorization of the death
penalty for murder and rape. Courts-martial retained jurisdiction over
all wartime murder and rape, and all peacetime murder and rape com-
mitted outside the continental United States. Congress, however, for the
first time differentiated between classes of murder. By its 1948 enact-
ment, Congress continued the death penalty as an authorized punishment
for any rape triable by court-martial, but made only premeditated murder
a capital offense. 0 7 Subsequent revisions to the 1948 Articles were
purely procedural. The next substantive change to the Army's death
penalty jurisprudence occurred when Congress enacted the Uniform
Code of Military Justice ("UCMJ") in 1950. At the time of the UCMJ's
enactment, the Articles of War permitted the death penalty for a bevy of
100. See id. art. 88.
101. See id. art. 93.
102. Id.
103. See id. art. 43 (providing that the death penalty must be explicitly authorized in an article
for it to be a capital offense).
104. See id. art. 92.
105. See id.
106. National Defense Act Amendments of 1920, ch. 227, art. 92, 41 Stat. 759, 805.
107. Selective Service Act of 1948 (Elston Act), ch. 625, § 235, 62 Stat. 604, 640.
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purely military offenses: striking a superior officer, wartime rape and
premeditated murder, and for peacetime rape and premeditated murder
outside the continental United States.
B. Death Penalty Jurisdiction Under Naval Law
For many reasons, Congress maintained separate Army and Navy
military justice systems until the passage of the UCMJ in 1950. The law
of the high seas has always been steeped in ancient traditions. Until
1950, naval military law, like maritime civil law and maritime insurance
law, tended to be based largely on centuries-old practices. For instance,
in 1799, Congress provided that sailors could be tried and punished for
offenses not set out in the Navy Articles according to the laws and cus-
toms of the sea. 08 That provision was reenacted in 1800 and remained a
part of naval law until the passage of the UCMJ.' ° Another reason for
the separate development of naval law from the law of land forces,
beyond mere tradition, had to do with the nature of naval service.
Unlike the Army, naval personnel spent a great majority of their time
outside the United States, either at sea or in foreign ports. For that rea-
son, sailors committing crimes were often outside the jurisdiction of
American civilian courts. Thus, courts-martial provided the only means
for American courts to punish serious criminal misbehavior by sailors.
The alternative to courts-martial was leaving accused sailors subject to
foreign law, where anti-American animus could result in unfair proceed-
ings. Additionally, the prospect of leaving a sailor in a foreign jail
awaiting trial while the ship carried on with its mission was both
impractical and undesirable.
Congress' first attempt to establish regulations for naval courts-
martial was the 1799 Act "for the Government of the Navy."' 10 Senior
naval officers drafted the Articles, which were reported to the House by
Representative Josiah Parker of Virginia, who remarked that as "the bill
was very long, and related entirely to the government of the Navy, he
did not think it necessary to detain the House in reading it.""' The bill
passed both houses without recorded debate or amendment." 2 Perhaps
the members of the House should have read it. The 1799 Navy Articles
were plagued by poor draftsmanship, giving many articles ambiguous
meanings. The 1799 Articles authorized the death penalty for seven
108. See Act of Mar. 2, 1799, ch. 24, § 1, art. 46, 1 Stat. 709, 715.
109. See Act of Apr. 23, 1800, ch. 33, § 1, art. XXXII, 2 Stat. 45, 49.
110. See Act of Mar. 2, 1799, ch. 24.
111. 9 ANNALS OF CONG. 2753 (1799), quoted in Wiener, supra note 60, at 14.
112. Wiener, supra note 60, at 14.
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purely military offenses,' as well as for all murders,'' 4 spying,' 5 and
burning public property. 1 6 The most curious part of the 1799 Articles
was Article 44, which provided:
Every person guilty of mutiny, desertion or disobedience to his supe-
rior officer on shore, acting in the proper line of his duty, shall be
tried by a court martial, and suffer the like punishment for every such
offence, as if the same had been committed at sea, on board any ship
or vessel of war in the service of the United States." 7
The ambiguity of that article is two-fold, both of which directly affect
the subject-matter jurisdiction of Navy courts-martial. First, Article 44
stated that three specific crimes were cognizable by court-martial if
committed on shore." 8 By implication, that provision seems to deny
courts-martial jurisdiction over other crimes, such as murder and spying,
that did not occur at sea or aboard ship. Second, the use of the phrase
"acting in the proper line of his duty" leaves unanswered whether a
naval court-martial would have had jurisdiction over mutiny, desertion
or disobedience that occurred while the sailor was off duty.
These ambiguities are of little moment, however, because Congress
expressed its dissatisfaction with the 1799 Navy Articles a year later by
replacing them with a better crafted set of articles. Thus, it is probably
no coincidence that the 1800 Navy Articles were enacted in a bill enti-
tled, "An Act for the better government of the Navy of the United
States."" 9 The 1800 Navy Articles made sixteen crimes punishable by
death. Of those, twelve offenses were purely military offenses (i.e., they
were offenses that generally would not be illegal if committed by a civil-
ian).' 20 Article XII added spying as a capital offense."1 Although spy-
113. See generally Act of Mar. 2, 1799, ch. 24. The purely military offenses made capital by
the 1799 Articles were desertion in sight of the enemy (§ 1, art. 23); disobeying a superior officer
(§ 1, art. 24); mutiny and sedition (Q 1, art. 24); correspondence with the enemy (§ 1, art. 33);
failing to reveal messages received from the enemy (§ 1, art. 34); giving comfort to the enemy
(0 1, art. 36); and treacherously surrendering to the enemy (§ 1, art. 37). Id.
114. Id. art. 29.
115. See id. art. 35.
116. See id. art. 41.
117. Id. art. 44.
118. See id. (listing mutiny, desertion and disobedience to a superior officer).
119. Act of Apr. 23, 1800, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 45 (emphasis added).
120. The purely military capital offenses in the 1800 statute include: failing to clear a ship for
battle upon command (§ 1, art. IV); treacherously yielding or pusillanimously crying for quarter
(§ 1, art. IV); disobeying the commanding officer during battle (§ 1, art. V); desertion of duty in
sight of the enemy (§ 1, art. V); wrongful withdrawal from battle (§ 1, art. VI); correspondence
with the enemy (Q 1, art. X); failure to reveal correspondence received from the enemy (§ 1, art.
XI); mutiny and attempted mutiny (§ 1, art. XIII); disobeying a superior officer (§ 1, art. XIV);
desertion to the enemy (§ 1, art. XVI); desertion and enticing others to desert (§ 1, art. XVII); and
misbehavior by watchstanders (§ 1, art. XX). See id. § 1.
121. See id. art. XII.
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ing has a direct effect on military operations, it is not a purely military
offense because it is typically illegal whether committed by civilian or
servicemember. Congress also made striking a superior officer in the
execution of his office a capital offense,'22 much as it had done in the
Army Articles of War.123 Two other enumerated capital offenses carried
over from the failed 1799 Navy Articles, both of which were neither
purely military offenses, nor by definition, injurious to unit discipline or
readiness.
The first and most important of these crimes was murder committed
by sailors whose ship was outside the territorial jurisdiction of the
United States. 24 While crimes committed aboard ship clearly have a
direct and palpable effect on the ship's ability to accomplish its mission,
this is not necessarily true of all murders committed while ships are
outside American waters.
The second capital offense not necessarily service-connected was
setting fire to public property.125 Again, many acts falling under this
article would have had a direct effect on a ship's readiness; offenses
such as setting fire to a ship, or its supplies, come readily to mind.
There are a great many other cases, however, that have nothing to do
with the offender's naval service. For instance, setting fire to a post
office or a state-owned bridge while on leave would have been a capital
offense under Article XXV, regardless of the nexus between the act and
the offender's status as a member of the Navy. Moreover, Article XVII
clarified congressional intent as to offenses committed on shore, an area
left highly ambiguous by Article 44 of the 1799 Navy Articles: "All
offenses committed by persons belonging to the navy while on shore,
shall be punished in the same manner as if they had been committed at
sea."
126
Thus, as far back as 1799, Congress had determined that it was
appropriate to give naval courts-martial death penalty jurisdiction over
not just military offenses, but for selected non-military offenses having a
direct effect on a ship's discipline and readiness. Moreover, by 1800,
Congress explicitly and unambiguously created naval court-martial
jurisdiction over two capital offenses-murder committed abroad and
burning public property-which, depending on the circumstances, may
have had nothing to do with the offender's service in the United States
Navy. Congress did not revise the 1800 Navy Articles until 1862.127
122. See id. art. XIV.
123. See supra note 57.
124. See Act of Apr. 23, 1800, ch. 33, § 1, art. XXI, 1 Stat. 45, 48.
125. See id. art. XXV.
126. See id. art. XVII.
127. See Act of Jul. 17, 1862, ch. 204, 12 Stat. 600.
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While the 1862 and subsequent revisions to the Navy Articles made
some changes in naval law, such as a prohibition on flogging, 128 they did
not effect any substantial change on the number of offenses subject to
the death penalty. In one last paean to the traditions and customs of the
sea, while the Army Articles were revised in 1916, 1920, and 1948, the
Navy Articles remained essentially intact from 1862 until the passage of
the UCMJ in 1950.129
C. The Uniform Code of Military Justice
The UCMJ movement was born at a time when, as Colonel Wiener
appropriately put it, "uniformity became a near fetish."' 30 Congress had
established the Air Force in 1947, and all the services were housed
within the newly-created Department of Defense.' 3 1 Citizen-soldiers
returning from the Second World War had complained bitterly about the
inadequacies they perceived in the military justice system. 32 Congress,
sensing the public's desire to modernize court-martial practice, deter-
mined that the time had come for the services to operate under a single
system of justice.
The UCMJ adopted many of its provisions from the Army Articles
of War of 1916, along with the amendments of 1920 and 1948. How-
ever, Congress radically altered court-martial jurisdiction over common-
law capital offenses. Under the 1916 Articles, courts-martial did not
have jurisdiction to try rape or murder offenses committed in the United
States during peace. 33 The UCMJ removed this restriction, permitting
courts-martial to try all enumerated capital offenses no matter where or
when the crime was committed. 34 The UCMJ also made felony-murder
a capital offense whenever the underlying felony was an actual or
attempted burglary, sodomy, rape, robbery, or aggravated arson.'3 5
Finally, the UCMJ made striking a superior officer in the execution of
his duties, an offense punishable by death since 1776, a non-capital
crime whenever the crime was committed in time of peace.' 36
Furthermore, the UCMJ made two other changes that significantly
128. See id. art. 8.
129. See Frederick B. Wiener, American Military Law in the Light of the First Mutiny Act's
Tricentennial, 126 MIL. L. REv. 1, 25 (1989).
130. Id. at 32-33.
131. See National Security Act of 1947, ch. 343, 61 Stat. 495.
132. See Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140 (1953) (plurality opinion) (noting enactment of
the UCMJ was "prompted by a desire to meet objections and criticisms lodged against court-
martial procedures in the aftermath of World War II").
133. See Act of Aug. 29, 1916, ch. 418, § 1342, art. 92, 39 Stat. 619, 654.
134. See Act of May 5, 1950, ch. 169, arts. 118, 120, 64 Stat. 107, 140.
135. See id. art. 118(4).
136. See id. art. 90.
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affected court-martial jurisdiction. First, Congress eliminated the turno-
ver provision, which, since 1776, had required commanders to deliver
accused soldiers to the civil authorities for trial upon application by the
victim.1 37 This change was consistent with Congress' decision to give
courts-martial jurisdiction over all common-law felonies, whether capi-
tal or not. Second, in what was perhaps the most controversial part of
the UCMJ, Congress attempted to broaden the personal jurisdiction of
courts-martial. Where court-martial jurisdiction had been limited in the
past to active-duty servicemembers and camp-followers during time of
war, 38 Article 2 of the UCMJ purported to give courts-martial jurisdic-
tion over government employees and dependents accompanying an
armed force outside the United States.1 39 Article 3(a) of the UCMJ cre-
ated court-martial jurisdiction over discharged servicemembers for seri-
ous crimes committed during their military service whenever the crime
would not be cognizable by an American civilian court.' 4° Essentially,
the reach of Article 3(a) was limited to crimes committed overseas.
Broadening the personal jurisdiction of courts-martial to include these
classes of people engendered scholarly debate' 4 ' and, one by one, judi-
cial rebuke. In 1955, the Supreme Court held in United States ex rel.
Toth v. Quarles.42 that Congress could not empower courts-martial to
try a fully-discharged former servicemember for a murder he committed
in Korea while on active duty. 14 3 The Court recognized that the Consti-
tution empowered Congress to establish court-martial jurisdiction, but
stated that "the power granted Congress 'To make Rules' to regulate
'the land and naval Forces' would seem to restrict court-martial jurisdic-
tion to persons who are actually members or part of the armed
forces."" '
The Supreme Court was more incremental in rejecting Congress'
power to subject dependents and government employees to military law.
In 1956, the Court held in Reid v. Covert'4 5 that a dependent wife
charged with murdering her husband, an active duty soldier stationed in
Germany, could be tried by court-martial for that offense. 4 6 The Court
137. See Wiener, supra note 60, at 12.
138. See, e.g., Act of Aug. 29, 1916, ch. 418, § 1342, art. 2.
139. See Act of May 5, 1950, ch. 169, art. 2(11), 64 Stat. 107, 109.
140. See id. art. 3(a).
141. See generally Robinson 0. Everett, Persons Who Can Be Tried By Court-Martial, 5 J.
PUB. L. 148 (1956). Everett later served as Chief Judge of the Court of Military Appeals.
142. 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
143. See id. at 21-25.
144. Id. at 15.
145. 351 U.S. 487 (1956).
146. See id. at 491.
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eventually granted a petition for rehearing 47 and, upon reargument,
reversed itself. In a fractured opinion, a plurality of four Justices held
that civilian dependents were not members of the land and naval forces;
therefore, Congress could not use its power to regulate those forces to
justify creating jurisdiction over Ms. Covert.148 Justices Frankfurter and
Harlan concurred in the result, asserting that Congress could not subject
civilian dependents to trial by court-martial for capital offenses. 149 Jus-
tices Clark and Burton dissented, arguing that Congress had the same
power over capital and non-capital offenses, and that subjecting civilian
dependents living overseas to courts-martial fell within those powers. 50
Although the Covert opinions left open the possibility that Con-
gress could authorize courts-martial to try civilian dependents for non-
capital offenses, the Court closed the door on that possibility in Kinsella
v. United States ex rel. Singleton. 5 ' In Singleton, the Court explicitly
held that there was no distinction between capital and non-capital
offenses for purposes of court-martial jurisdiction over civilian depen-
dents; thus, Covert applied to all offenses, whether capital or not.1 52 In
two other opinions issued the same day as Singleton, the Court struck
down that part of Article 2 creating court-martial jurisdiction over civil-
ian employees for both capital and non-capital offenses. 153
While Toth, Covert and their progeny quickly disposed of Con-
gress' overreaching in the area of personal jurisdiction, courts imposed
no constraints on the subject-matter jurisdiction of courts-martial during
UMCJ's first eighteen years. In 1969, however, the Supreme Court
issued a landmark opinion in the case of O'Callahan v. Parker, 54 hold-
ing that Congress lacked the constitutional power to create court-martial
jurisdiction over offenses unrelated to the accused's military service. 55
The O'Callahan court relied heavily on historical practice, asserting that
materials relating to the jurisdiction of British and early American
courts-martial demonstrated an aversion to having military courts try
offenses that could be tried in civilian courts. 56 The Court also relied
147. Reid v. Covert, 352 U.S. 901 (1956).
148. See Covert, 354 U.S. at 19-21.
149. See id. at 49 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); id. at 65 (Harlan, J., concurring).
150. See id. at 78 (Clark, J., dissenting).
151. 361 U.S. 234 (1960).
152. See id. at 246.
153. See McElroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281, 284 (1960) (striking down
jurisdiction over civilian employees for non-capital offenses); Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278,
280 (1960) (striking down jurisdiction over civilian employees for capital offenses).
154. 395 U.S. 258 (1969), overruled by Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435 (1987).
155. See id. at 272-73.
156. See id. at 268 ("Both in England prior to the American Revolution and in our own
national history military trial of soldiers committing civilian offenses has been viewed with
suspicion.") (footnote omitted).
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on language in Toth to the effect that court-martial jurisdiction should be
confined to "the least possible power adequate to the end proposed." '57
Finally, the majority opinion justified its decision with a lengthy
harangue against the military justice system as a whole. 158
The Court's decision in O'Callahan was sharply criticized by Jus-
tice Harlan in his dissenting opinion,159 and launched a flurry of schol-
arly criticism. 160  The Court subsequently announced that the service-
connection test would not be applied retroactively. Moreover, military
courts applied the O'Callahan rule in a manner that limited its reach,
creating a service-connection threshold that at times seemed ridiculously
low given the language of O'Callahan.161  While military courts since
157. Id. at 265 (quoting United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 23 (1955)).
158. See id. at 265-66 (calling courts-martial "singularly inept in dealing with the nice
subtleties of constitutional law").
159. Id. at 274-83.
160. See, e.g., Robinson 0. Everett, O'Callahan v. Parker, Milestone or Millstone in Military
Justice?, 1969 DUKE L.J. 853 (1969); Grant S. Nelson & James E. Westbrook, Court-Martial
Jurisdiction Over Servicemen for "Civilian" Offenses: An Analysis of O'Callahan v. Parker, 54
MINN. L. REV. 1 (1969); Ronald L. Wilkinson, The Narrowing Scope of Court-Martial
Jurisdiction: O'Callahan v. Parker, 9 WASHBURN L.J. 193 (1969); Peter W. Bowie, Comment,
O'Callahan v. Parker: Sounding the Death Knell of Military Justice?, 7 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 55
(1970); John F. DePue, Comment, O'Callahan and its Progeny: A Survey of Their Impact on the
Jurisdiction of Courts-Martial, 15 VILL. L. REv. 712 (1970); Don A. Wetzel, Note, O'Callahan v.
Parker, A Military Jurisdictional Dilemma, 22 BAYLOR L. REV. 64 (1970); David F. O'Connor &
Teresa M. Schwartz, Recent Decisions: Military Law, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 170 (1969-1970).
161. See, e.g., United States v. Goldman, 40 C.M.R. 228, 229 (C.M.A. 1969) (holding a
counterfeiting offense committed in Vietnam was service connected because it was committed in
the "zone of conflict"); United States v. Weinstein, 41 C.M.R. 29, 30 (C.M.A. 1969) (holding that
the off base possession of marijuana by a serviceman in Germany was service connected because
it otherwise would not be cognizable by American courts); United States v. Sharkey, 41 C.M.R.
26, 28 (C.M.A. 1969) (holding that O'Callahan did not apply to petty offenses); United States v.
Keaton, 41 C.M.R. 64, 68 (C.M.A. 1969) (holding that O'Callahan was "inapplicable to courts-
martial held outside the territorial limits of the United States"); United States v. Newvine, 48
C.M.R. 960, 962 (C.M.A. 1974) (finding the overseas exception to O'Callahan applicable even
when serviceman's offense occurred while he was overseas on vacation); United States v. Moore,
1 M.J. 448, 450 (C.M.A. 1976) (holding that offenses occurring on base are per se service
connected); Murray v. Haldeman, 16 M.J. 74, 77 (C.M.A. 1983) (holding that off-post drug use,
even when occurring on leave far from the accused's duty station, is service connected if the
accused ever entered a military base while subject to the effects of the drug); United States v.
Garries, 19 M.J. 845, 851 (A.F.C.M.R. 1985) (holding that serviceman's murder of his wife was
service connected merely because it was committed on base), aff'd, 22 M.J. 288 (C.M.A.), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 985 (1986); United States v. Williamson, 19 M.J. 617 (A.C.M.R. 1984) (finding
service connection where serviceman committed lewd acts upon the minor daughter of his
subordinate soldier where offense occurred off base), petition denied, 21 M.J. 24 (C.M.A. 1985);
United States v. Mauck, 17 M.J. 1033, 1034-35 (A.C.M.R.) (finding service-connection in
attempted murder case where serviceman had met his victim, a military retiree's daughter, on base
that evening and left her body fifteen feet outside the base, even though crime occurred off base),
petition denied, 19 M.J. 106 (C.M.A. 1984). See generally Jonathan P. Tomes, The Imagination
of the Prosecutor: The Only Limitation to Off-Post Jurisdiction Now, Fifteen Years After
O'Callahan v. Parker, 25 A.F. L. REv. 1 (1985) (asserting that, by 1985, the O'Callahan doctrine
had been rendered nugatory by judicial precedent).
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1969 had effectively side-stepped O'Callahan, finding it illogical,
unworkable, or both, the Supreme Court finally followed suit in the
1987 case of Solorio v. United States.1 62 In Solorio, the Court explicitly
abandoned the service-connection test, finding the historical materials
far too ambiguous to support the jurisdictional limitation created by the
O'Callahan court. 163 The Court replaced the service-connection test
with the mere status test that had existed before O'Callahan. If the
accused had the status of an active duty servicemember at the time of the
alleged offense, such that he or she was amenable to military jurisdic-
tion, then the court-martial had authority to exercise jurisdiction over the
accused. 164
D. The Lesson of Historical Practice
In his concurring opinion in Loving, Justice Stevens, speaking for
himself and three other Justices, asserted that a death penalty offense
might have to be connected to the accused's service for the crime to be
cognizable by courts-martial. 65 Justice Stevens' justified this assertion
by stating that a "review of the historical materials would seem to under-
mine any contention that a military tribunal's power to try capital
offenses must be as broad as its power to try non-capital ones." 166 Thus,
Justice Stevens makes two interrelated arguments. The first is a factual
assertion that the death penalty jurisdiction of courts-martial has histori-
cally been narrower than the jurisdiction for non-capital offenses.
Assuming this factual assertion is true, Justice Stevens' argument
advances into its legal phase, that an historical aversion on the part of
Congress to granting death penalty jurisdiction over civilian offenses
affects Congress' power to later change course and confer greater juris-
diction over such cases.
A review of the historical death penalty jurisdiction of courts-mar-
tial demonstrates that there have been times when the court-martial juris-
diction over some capital offenses-particularly murder and rape-was
narrower than the jurisdiction over other offenses. For enumerated non-
capital offenses, Congress has always made status the only test for juris-
diction; if the accused belonged to one of the classes subject to military
law, then the inquiry was over. In the Navy, however, courts-martial did
not have jurisdiction over murders committed in the United States until
the UCMJ took effect in 195 1.167 In the Army, the first Articles of War
162. 483 U.S. 435 (1987).
163. See id. at 445-46.
164. See id. at 450-5 1.
165. See Loving v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1737, 1751 (1996) (Stevens, J., concurring).
166. Id.
167. See supra notes 107-29 and accompanying text.
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made only purely military offenses eligible for the death penalty. 68 The
1776 Articles created several additional capital offenses, including
two-striking a superior officer and assaulting a camp supplier-which,
if committed in the United States, would be triable in civilian courts. 16 9
In 1863, Congress for the first time gave courts-martial jurisdiction over
murder and rape, but only when committed in wartime, and the availa-
bility of the death penalty depended on local law. 170 Congress took this
jurisdiction over capital murder and rape two steps further in 1916.
First, Congress explicitly made those offenses capital offenses, without
resort to local punishment tables.1 7 1 Second, Congress went beyond
wartime murders and rapes and gave Army courts-martial jurisdiction
over peacetime murders and rapes committed outside the continental
United States. 72 In 1950, Congress finally removed any restriction on
the authority of Army and Navy courts-martial to try capital offenses;
like non-capital offenses, status became the only test.1 73
Thus, there is some truth in Justice Stevens' factual premise. For
example, a soldier who committed murder in the United States in 1910,
when the nation was not at war, could not be haled before a court-mar-
tial for that crime, although he could be tried for any non-capital offense
he may have committed. Nevertheless, Justice Stevens' view of the his-
torical jurisdiction of courts-martial is overly simplistic, and relies on
isolated enactments without regard to their proper place in the develop-
ment of court-martial jurisdiction.
Historically, there can be no dispute that Congress has repeatedly
and consistently expanded the death penalty jurisdiction of courts-mar-
tial every time it has passed on the matter. The qualifications that Con-
gress has placed upon capital murder and rape must be considered in
light of the fact that Congress was not reining in court-martial jurisdic-
tion with any of those enactments. Rather, with each new statute, Con-
gress was granting courts-martial increased death penalty jurisdiction
and was merely limiting the rate of its expansion. The history of capital
murder jurisdiction is illustrative of this point.
In 1863, Congress created potential death penalty jurisdiction over
murder, but limited it to wartime offenses. When Congress revisited the
Articles of War in 1916, it apparently believed that jurisdiction over
common-law capital offenses had passed the test of time and expanded it
once more, to cover peacetime murder committed overseas. For
168. See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 85-94 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
172. See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
173. See Act of May 5, 1950, ch. 169, arts. 118, 120, 64 Stat. 107, 140.
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instance, in Kahn v. Anderson,174 the Supreme Court noted that "the
differences between the articles of 1874 and those of 1916 show[] a
purpose to rearrange the jurisdiction of courts-martial." '75 Thirty-four
years later, Congress must have believed that the 1916 experience had
proven fruitful because it eliminated the jurisdictional prohibition on
peacetime domestic murder-the last jurisdictional difference between
capital murder and non-capital offenses. It is, therefore, illogical to look
at restrictions Congress placed on jurisdiction over murder as an attempt
to restrain the exercise of jurisdiction. A more appropriate way to view
this series of legislation is that Congress, in expanding death penalty
jurisdiction, preferred to move in small steps, view the outcome, and
then reevaluate the issue in light of the test of time. It was through these
small steps that Congress, from 1775 to 1950, embarked on a steady,
one hundred seventy-five-year forced march from an extremely limited
death penalty jurisdiction to the current jurisdiction covering most, if not
all, civilian capital offenses.' 76
Thus, where Justice Stevens' factual premise errs is in the assertion
that historical practice evidences congressional reluctance to give courts-
martial jurisdiction over civilian capital crimes. But, even if Justice Ste-
vens' factual premise were correct, there are serious deficiencies with
his argument that historical practice mandates a service-connection test
for capital offenses.
The first problem with this legal conclusion is one of pure logic.
The Constitution grants Congress the power to establish the jurisdiction
of courts-martial. 77 In doing so, Congress must work within two
parameters: The Constitution and legislative policy. Obviously, Con-
gress can create jurisdiction no broader than the Constitution permits.
Within that range of permissible jurisdiction, Congress must make pol-
icy decisions as to the jurisdiction it will create. Although the Constitu-
tion might permit Congress to criminalize driving an automobile with
any alcohol in one's system, Congress can also make the policy determi-
nation to criminalize such activity only when the driver's blood-alcohol
content exceeds a certain level.' 78 The Supreme Court made this very
point in Coleman v. Tennessee. 7 9 In holding that the 1863 statute creat-
ing court-martial jurisdiction over capital murder in time of war did not
deprive state courts of the power to try such offenses, the Court stated:
We do not mean to intimate that it was not within the competency of
174. 255 U.S. 1 (1921).
175. Id. at 10.
176. See Wiener, supra note 60, at 11.
177. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
178. See, e.g., UNIF. CODE OF MIL. JUST., art. 111, 10 U.S.C. § 911 (1994).
179. 97 U.S. 509 (1878).
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Congress to confer exclusive jurisdiction upon military courts over
offenses committed by persons in the military service of the United
States. As Congress is expressly authorized by the Constitution "to
raise and support armies," and "to make rules for the government and
regulation of the land and naval forces," its control over the whole
subject of the formation, organization and government of the national
armies, including therein the punishment of offenses committed by
persons in the military service, would seem to be plenary. 8°
The Court recognized that Congress made a prudential decision at that
time not to use the full extent of its constitutional power to regulate the
armed forces. That prudential decision cannot be said to have narrowed
Congress' constitutional power to create court-martial jurisdiction sim-
ply because Congress decided in 1863 not to use the full complement of
its power. 81 Such a contention would elevate the 1863 statute from
legislation to a de facto constitutional amendment-an amendment
effected without the procedure prescribed by the Constitution.18 2 Simi-
larly, in the formative years of the Republic, Congress enacted almost no
legislation relating to the regulation of commerce; that policy decision
not to regulate certainly did not limit Congress' constitutional power to
regulate interstate commerce in the 1990s.183 As the Court stated in
Madsen v. Kinsella,'84 another case dealing with Congress' war powers,
"[t]he policy of Congress to refrain from legislating in this uncharted
area does not imply its lack of power to legislate."1 85  Historical prac-
tice may be a useful tool in pursuit of the Framers' interpretation of the
Constitution they created. However, that sort of argument cannot rest on
historical practice alone; instead, it requires a consideration of other evi-
dence of the Framers' intent in placing a provision in the Constitution,
180. Id. at 514.
181. See id.
182. See U.S. CONST. art. V (requiring that all constitutional amendments be ratified by three-
fourths of the states).
183. For example, the Supreme Court has found it constitutional for Congress to regulate local
loansharking activities, United States v. Perez, 402 U.S. 146 (1971), and to prohibit segregation of
local diners, Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964), under the auspices of its commerce
powers, even though Congress had not regulated such local activities during the first 150 years of
the Republic.
184. 343 U.S. 341 (1952).
185. Id. at 348-49. In O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969), overruled by Solorio v.
United States, 483 U.S. 435 (1987), Justice Harlan said the following about the value of historical
practice:
Even if the practice of early American courts-martial had been otherwise, this would
hardly lead to the conclusion that Congress lacked the power to authorize military
trials under the present circumstances. It cannot be seriously argued as a general
matter that the constitutional limits of congressional power are coterminous with the
extent of its exercise in the late 18th and early 19th centuries.
Id. at 280 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
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including the concerns of the times and the Framers' statements at the
Constitutional Convention and during the ratification process. That
inquiry will be taken up elsewhere in this article; needless to say, there is
no evidence that early congressional action vis-a-vis court-martial juris-
diction was anything other than a pure policy choice.
The other weakness in Justice Stevens' argument is that, even if his
historical analysis were accurate, it does not lead to the remedy-a ser-
vice-connection test for death penalty jurisdiction-proposed in the Lov-
ing concurrence. Assuming that historical practice logically bears on
Congress' current power to create court-martial jurisdiction, and assum-
ing that the historical materials did not support an unfettered death pen-
alty jurisdiction, the solution would not be the imposition of a service-
connection test. If history dictated current constitutional powers, the
rule would have to be that Congress could create jurisdiction no broader
than it historically had. The first problem with this is rather obvious. At
what time in history are we talking about? Let us not forget that for a
full one-fifth of United States history-since 1951-congressional prac-
tice created a death penalty jurisdiction equally as broad as non-death
penalty jurisdiction.' 86 Beyond that, none of Congress' previous enact-
ments created a strict service-connection test for capital jurisdiction.
Congress' grant of murder jurisdiction to the Navy in 1800 was
based on the ship being outside United States waters when the murder
was committed. 87 Imagine the case of a sailor, in uniform, who goes to
a local watering hole on shore leave and has too much to drink. He sees
his petty officer, for whom he has little regard, and proceeds to tell the
petty officer what he thinks of his leadership ability. The argument ends
when the sailor invites his petty officer outside and stabs him to death.
That offense plainly would be service-connected under any definition of
the term. However, under the 1800 statute, that offense would be triable
by court-martial if committed in, say, Naples, but not if it occurred in
Philadelphia. Thus, the 1800 statute was based not on service-connec-
tion, but rather on pure geography. Similarly, the "time of war" qualifi-
cations on murder and rape jurisdiction passed by Congress in 1863 and
1916 did not establish a service connection test.1 88 Therefore, Justice
186. See generally Act of May 5, 1950, ch. 169, 64 Stat. 140 (eliminating temporal and
geographic constraints on death penalty jurisdiction).
187. See supra note 124.
188. See supra notes 85-105 and accompanying text. For example, during the Spanish-
American War, a conflict that never reached American shores, capital murder was a court-martial
offense, even if it occurred in the soldier's hometown, out of uniform, and during an extended
period of leave. Conversely, a soldier who murdered his sergeant on base and in uniform only
could be tried in civilian courts if the crime occurred in 1910, simply because the nation was not at
war.
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Stevens' assertion in Loving, that past congressional practice mandates a
service connection rule, ignores that such a rule has never been part of
any past congressional practice.
If historical practice did impact Congress' power to create court-
martial jurisdiction, then the rule would not be service-connection, but
an amalgam of previous qualifications on murder and rape jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction over all overseas offenses would be constitutional," 9 as
would jurisdiction over domestic offenses committed during time of
war. 190 That would leave all domestic, peacetime murder and rape
offenses as being barred from court-martial jurisdiction, whether those
offenses were service-connected or not. And, of course, such a rule
would have to conveniently explain away the forty-six-year history-
1951 to 1997-where the jurisdiction of capital offenses has been
exactly the same as for non-capital offenses.
While Justice Stevens' proposed remedy does not coincide with
historical practice, it still leaves as an open question whether past con-
gressional practice is a clue as to the Framers' intentions for Congress'
power to create court-martial jurisdiction. To make this assessment, it is
necessary to consider the issues facing the Framers as they crafted the
Constitution and the views of the Framers as expressed at the Conven-
tion and during the ratification debates. Finally, it is necessary to con-
sider Supreme Court precedent in order to divine what the Court, as the
final arbiter of constitutional interpretation, has had to say about Con-
gress' power to regulate the armed forces.
III. A REEXAMINATION OF CONGRESS' POWER TO REGULATE THE
ARMED FORCES
In Solorio, a majority of the Court found the history of court-mar-
tial jurisdiction "far too ambiguous to justify the restriction of the plain
language of Clause 14" and the imposition of a blanket service-
connection test.19 ' The same must be said for Justice Stevens' attempt
to resurrect the service-connection test for capital cases. Historical qual-
ifications on death penalty jurisdiction, in the context of Congress'
repeated expansion of such jurisdiction, do not, by themselves, support a
constitutional prohibition on Congress taking the final step along the
trail and removing all qualifications on death penalty jurisdiction.
Moreover, the logical problems inherent in basing constitutional inter-
pretation on historical exercise of a discretionary power cannot be over-
189. See supra note 124.
190. See supra notes 85-94 and accompanying text.
191. Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 445 (1987).
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stated. 192 However, historical analysis, by itself, does not demonstrate
that the Constitution necessarily grants Congress the unqualified power
to establish the jurisdiction over capital offenses as broad as it is over
non-capital offenses. Thus, a review of historical practice, as urged by
Justice Stevens, brings us back to where we started, with a constitutional
provision in need of interpretation. That interpretation requires a con-
sideration of the language in the Constitution, the intentions of the
Framers, and judicial precedent bearing on Congress' power to regulate
the Armed Forces. A careful review of all of those areas makes clear
that the Constitution grants Congress a plenary power to set the subject-
matter jurisdiction of courts-martial. Once an accused is determined to
be a member of the "land and naval forces," and therefore, amenable to
trial by court-martial, the jurisdictional inquiry ends. Personal amena-
bility to military law is the touchstone of court-martial jurisdiction;
whether the offenses charged are punishable by death has no jurisdic-
tional significance.
A. The Plain Language of Clause 14
In discussing statutory interpretation, Justice Frankfurter once said,
"Though we may not end with the words in construing a disputed stat-
ute, one certainly begins there."' 93 The same is true of constitutional
interpretation, for the language of the Constitution, if unambiguous,
most probably reflects the intentions of the Framers who drafted it and
the states that ratified it.' 94 Congress' power to establish the jurisdiction
of courts-martial is most clearly contained in Article I, Section 8, Clause
14, which states that Congress shall have the power "To make Rules for
the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces."'195 The
first important fact about the text itself is that the clause contains abso-
lutely no express limitation on this grant of power to Congress. More-
over, the clause appears in Article I, Section 8, which contains a series
of unrestricted congressional powers such as the commerce power and
the power to coin money.' 96 Additionally, Clause 14 does not mention
the death penalty as being separate and distinct from non-capital
offenses from a jurisdictional standpoint. Only the most ardent literalist,
however, would stop there and conclude that the absence of express lim-
itations in the text forecloses the possibility that any limitations exist.
192. See supra notes 177-85 and accompanying text.
193. Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527,
535 (1947).
194. See 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 401, at 306 (Melville M. Bigelow ed., 5th ed. 1891).
195. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
196. See id. art. I, § 8, cls. 3 (commerce power), 5 (power to coin money).
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Despite the grandeur of the document, the Constitution is not free of
poor draftsmanship, or places where the express language most likely
does not coincide with the Framers' intent.
To take a familiar example, the Fifth Amendment excepts courts-
martial from the requirement of a grand jury indictment. 197 The Sixth
Amendment, however, does not except courts-martial from the right to a
jury trial. 98 The Supreme Court, however, recognized early on that the
Framers clearly did not intend for the right to a jury trial to extend to
courts-martial. Thus, in Ex parte Milligan,'99 the Court essentially
grafted the Fifth Amendment's exception for military cases onto the
Sixth Amendment.2°° This decision has been applauded by experts on
military law as being consistent with the Framers' true intention.2 °1
At a minimum, the plain language of Clause 14 lends support to the
premise that Congress' power to set court-martial jurisdiction is plenary
and that there is no constitutional difference between Congress' power
over capital cases and over non-capital cases. To the extent that the
clause's plain language, and an ambiguous historical practice, leaves
open the theoretical possibility that there might exist constitutional
restrictions on court-martial jurisdiction, that possibility is firmly fore-
closed by analysis of the Framers' actual intent and of Supreme Court
precedent.
B. The Framers' Intent for Clause 14
The Framers gathered in Philadelphia during the summer of 1787
because the Articles of Confederation had proven to be a singular fail-
ure. Although the delegates to the Constitutional Convention had been
sent by their respective states with the understanding that they were to
propose amendments to the current Articles, the delegates came to real-
ize that the Republic could be saved only by a complete rewriting of the
Articles, one that would fundamentally reorder the division of powers
between the states and the fledgling federal government.20 2 As delegate
James Madison put it, the Convention was gathered "now to decide for-
ever the fate of Republican government. '2°3 The basic problem with the
Articles of Confederation was that the federal government was impotent
in any matter that was not supported unanimously by the states. Under
the Articles, Congress lacked the power of direct taxation; the most it
197. See id. amend. V.
198. See id. amend. VI.
199. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
200. See id. at 124.
201. See, e.g., WINTHROP, supra note 46, at 105; Henderson, supra note 21, at 304-05.
202. See CHARLES A. BEARD, THE ENDURING FEDERALIST 30 (1948).
203. MAX FARRAND, THE FATHERS OF THE CONSTITUTION 108 (1921).
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could do was assign each state a monetary quota, with each state to raise
the money through taxation or other means. 0 4 State legislatures tended
to drag their feet or otherwise refuse to raise money for any quota going
toward something that state opposed. Thus, the federal government fell
into debt and saw its legislation frustrated because each individual state
had the power of the purse.20 5 Even when the Congress could fund the
laws it passed, it was powerless to enforce them against recalcitrant
states because the Articles made no provision for an executive branch to
enforce laws or a federal judiciary to interpret congressional enactments
or the Articles themselves." 6 Similarly, the Articles of Confederation
gave Congress the power to make treaties, but Congress could not force
the individual states to comply with them.20 7
While those problems were significant, perhaps the most pressing
deficiency in the Articles of Confederation was the complete lack of
power by the federal government to defend the Republic against foreign
invasion or domestic insurrection. Similar to its inability to raise reve-
nue, Congress could not raise an army without relying on the states. The
Articles of Confederation made no provisions for a standing army, and
Congress could raise militia forces only by giving each state a quota to
fill. 208 Shays' Rebellion, which occurred less than a year before the
Framers met in Philadelphia, made clear that the federal government
could not operate under such a system. Shays' Rebellion was a revolt by
farmers in western Massachusetts against all levels of government.20 9
Frustrated by debts and heavy taxation, these farmers seized the North-
ampton county courthouse and disrupted legal proceedings in five other
Massachusetts counties. 20  The Articles of Confederation did not
authorize Congress to call out the militia in the face of a domestic rebel-
lion. 11 In fact, the Articles did not even permit Congress to use force to
protect the federal arsenal at Springfield from capture.21 2 Nevertheless,
Congress reacted to the revolt by resolving to raise 1,300 militiamen
from the New England states, using the pretext of an Indian conflict to
204. See BEARD, supra note 202, at 28.
205. See id. at 29; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 15, at 95 (Alexander Hamilton) (Paul
Leicester Ford ed., 1918) ("The measures of the Union have not been executed; the delinquencies
of the States have, step by step, matured themselves to an extreme, which has at length arrested all
the wheels of the national government and brought them to an awful stand.").
206. See BEARD, supra note 202, at 28.
207. See id. at 29.
208. See RICHARD H. KOHN, EAGLE AND SWORD 75 (1975).
209. See BEARD, supra note 202, at 28.
210. See KOHN, supra note 208, at 74.
211. See id. at 75.
212. See id.
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justify its action. z13 Shays' Rebellion was eventually put down after
about six months by militiamen raised primarily from eastern Massachu-
setts.21 4 Congress' attempt to raise a federal militia demonstrated the
impotence of federal power. Under the Articles of Confederation, the
vast majority of the militia quotas established by Congress went
unfilled, as states far from the conflict were reluctant to comply with any
sense of urgency.215
Shays's Rebellion crystallized for the Framers the problems inher-
ent in the Articles of Confederation. Requiring Congress to go through
the states to raise armies and revenue was both unreliable and ineffi-
cient. Moreover, under the Articles, Congress lacked the power to put
down domestic unrest. Furthermore, Great Britain, France, and Spain all
owned possessions in the New World, creating the likelihood of future
armed conflict.2 16 Thus, one of the primary purposes of the Constitu-
tional Convention was to give the federal government sufficient power
to protect the nation both against foreign foes and against rebellion at
home.2 17 As Ebenezer Wales of Massachusetts prophetically said of
Shays's Rebellion, "I believe that the Tumults here, in this State will
Alarm the other States; and by that Means Congress will Soon have
Suffict Powers For the Benefitt of the Whole. 2 18
This is not to suggest that the Framers were unconcerned with giv-
ing the federal government control of the nation's military power. A
mere decade earlier, the colonists had revolted against the suffocating
control exercised by the British Crown over every aspect of colonial
life.219 The Framers were quite leery of the possibility that arming the
federal government could result in trading one monarchy for another, a
213. See id. at 74; see also JACKSON T. MAIN, THE ANTIFEDERALISTS: CRITICS OF THE
CONSTITUTION 63 (1961).
214. See KOHN, supra note 208, at 74.
215. Alexander Hamilton was particularly concerned with the tendency of states not to support
conflicts far from their borders. See THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 134 (Alexander Hamilton) (Paul
Leicester Ford ed., 1918) ("The States near the seat of war, influenced by motives of self-
preservation, made efforts to furnish their quotas, which even exceeded their abilities; while those
at a distance from danger were for, the most part, as remiss as the others were diligent in their
exertions.").
216. See BEARD, supra note 202, at 29; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 4, at 18-19 (John Jay)
(Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1918) (noting the likelihood of territorial disputes with the great
European powers).
217. See STEVEN R. BOYD, THE POLITICS OF OPPOSITION: ANTIFEDERALISTS AND THE
ACCEPTANCE OF THE CONSTITUTION 5 (1979) ("Shays' Rebellion .... also induced some former
opponents of a convention to support it .... ); KOHN, supra note 208, at 75 (citing remarks of
Edmund Randolph at Constitutional Convention).
218. Letter from Ebenezer Wales to Caleb Davis (Nov. 4, 1786), quoted in MAIN, supra note
213, at 64.
219. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 145
(1969).
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
concern the Anti-Federalists voiced both at the Convention and during
the ratification debates. 220 The Anti-Federalists, in particular, were con-
cerned that the federal government, by its very nature, could not help but
become an oppressive force. 221  Specifically, the Anti-Federalists
believed the greatest potential for oppression came from the executive
branch.222 The greatest blame for the excesses of British rule fell, in the
Anti-Federalists' eyes, on the use of executive prerogative by the British
Crown.223 This fear of an overweening executive certainly was a major
reason why the Articles of Confederation did not provide for a federal
executive. 2 4 Thus, where the Anti-Federalists were concerned with the
dangers of a power of federal taxation, the creation of a national stand-
225 iing army reinforced their fears of federal oppression. Against this
backdrop of competing interests-the need for a more effective federal
government and the fear of federal oppression-the Framers crafted the
variety of provisions that provided for a national defense.
The delegates to the Constitutional Convention balanced these
competing interests by dividing power over the military between the
President and Congress. The Constitution made the President the Com-
mander-in-Chief of the army and navy, as well as of the militia when in
actual service.2 26 The President was also authorized to negotiate treaties
220. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 286 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed.
1937) [hereinafter FARRAND]; see LETTER FROM THE "FEDERAL FARMER" (Jan. 7, 1788), reprinted
in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 281, 285 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981); LETTER FROM THE
"FEDERAL FARMER" (Jan 14, 1788), reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST at 301, 302
(Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981) ("We all agree, that a large standing army has a strong tendency to
depress and inslave the people .... ").
221. See DAVID G. SMITH, THE CONVENTION AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE POLITICAL IDEAS OF
THE FOUNDING FATHERS 35-36 (1965).
222. See FORREST McDONALD, A CONSTrTTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 28-29
(1982).
223. See STEPHEN SAUNDERS WEBB, THE GOVERNORS-GENERAL: THE ENGLISH ARMY AND
THE DEFINITION OF THE EMPIRE, 1569-1681, 4 (1979) ("The officers and governors who ruled
British towns and American colonies were the instruments of an overweening prerogative power,
the agents of an actual executive conspiracy.").
224. See generally THE ESSENTIAL ANTIFEDERALIST viii (W.B. Allen & Gordon Lloyd eds.,
1985).
225. As Benjamin Workman, one of the leading Anti-Federalist pamphlet writers of the
ratification period wrote, "There is no doubt, but to carry the arbitrary decrees of the federal
judges into execution, and to protect the tax gatherers in collecting the revenue, will be ample
employment for the military .... " LETTER FROM "PHILADELPHIENSIS" [BENJAMIN WORKMAN]
(Dec. 12, 1787), reprinted in 1 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION 494, 496 (Bernard Bailyn ed.,
1993); see also LETTER FROM "CENTINEL" TO THE FREEMEN OF PENNSYLVANIA (Oct. 5, 1787),
reprinted in THE ANTIFEDERALISTS 2, 8-9 (Cecelia M. Kenyon ed., 1985) ("[T]o grant all the great
executive powers of a confederation, and a standing army in time of peace, that grand engine of
oppression, and moreover the absolute control over the commerce of the United States and all the
external objects of revenue... they are to be vested with every species of internal taxation .....
226. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1.
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and to appoint ambassadors to other nations.227 On the other hand, the
Framers vested the powers to declare war and to raise an army and navy
in the Congress.228 The Constitution limited Congress' power to main-
tain a standing army by providing that Congress could not appropriate
funds for a standing army for any period of more than two years.229
Early drafts of the Constitution did not even contain a provision
granting Congress the power to regulate the armed forces. 230  Even
though the Necessary and Proper Clause probably made Clause 14
redundant in light of Congress's power to maintain an army and navy,
the delegates added that provision to the draft without objection.231
There is no evidence of discussion at the Constitutional Convention of
the propriety of what became Clause 14.232 Justice Story and others
have speculated that the Clause was inserted not as a declaration that the
federal government would have the power to regulate its own armed
forces, but rather to ensure that this federal power was vested in the
Congress rather than the President.233 The Supreme Court has agreed
that Clause 14 appears to speak not to whether the federal government
would have this power; instead, the clause establishes which part of the
federal government would have it. Whatever concerns the public might
have had about court-martial jurisdiction over civilian crimes, the Court
has held that such concerns "were met by vesting in Congress, rather
than the Executive, authority to make rules for the government of the
military. ' 23 4 Thus, Clause 14 follows a trend that can be seen through-
out the Constitution: when the Framers were faced with a power needed
by the federal government, but potentially dangerous to state sover-
eignty, the Framers struck the balance by giving the power to the Con-
gress rather than the President.235
The need for an effective federal military power, made clear to the
227. See id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
228. See id. art. I, § 8, cls. 11, 12.
229. See id. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
230. See 2 STORY, supra note 194, § 1197, at 113-14.
231. See id. at 114.
232. See id.
233. See id. ("The whole power is far more safe in the hands of Congress than of the executive;
since, otherwise, the most summary and severe punishments might be inflicted at the mere will of
the executive."); 1 CRossKEY, supra note 77, at 412-13 (stating that the Framers considered
regulation of the military an arguably executive power under existing law, necessitating a
provision explicitly conferring that power on Congress).
234. Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 446 (1987).
235. See McDONALD, supra note 222, at 29 (noting that the Framers gave executive powers,
such as the power to declare war and the power to coin money, to the Congress); see also 2 THE
DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 97-98 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1836) (providing remarks of Thomas Dawes at the
Massachusetts convention).
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Framers during the embarrassing federal response to Shays' Rebellion,
is strong evidence that the delegates did not intend to restrain Congress
by imposing amorphous, yet judicially-cognizable, restrictions on regu-
lation of the armed forces. Moreover, a broad power to regulate the
armed forces is consistent with the delegates' demonstrated tendency to
limit the threat of the new federal government, not by making potentially
dangerous federal powers nugatory, but by ensuring those powers were
vested in Congress. While these observations provide strong circum-
stantial evidence of the original intent for Clause 14, the best direct evi-
dence of the Framers' intent exists within the framework of the
ratification debates.
Once the contents of the draft Constitution became public, propo-
nents and opponents of the Constitution engaged in a battle of pamphlets
and newspaper articles designed to drive public opinion either in favor
of or against the new compact.236 As any student of constitutional his-
tory knows, the most important tool of the Constitution's supporters was
The Federalist Papers, a series of eighty-five articles that systematically
addressed the various provisions in the new Constitution, along with
arguments why the Constitution would not be a threat to the liberty of
states or their citizens. The authors of The Federalist Papers, particu-
larly Alexander Hamilton, wrote a great deal about the military power
created by the proposed Constitution, something unsurprising consider-
ing that a substantial portion of the Anti-Federalist invective focused on
that very issue.
A recurring theme of The Federalist Papers is the difference
between granting control over the military to Congress and granting that
power to the Executive.237 In Federalist Number 23, Alexander Hamil-
ton offered a three-part argument for the military establishment author-
ized by the Constitution. First, the experience under the Articles of
Confederation had demonstrated that an effective common defense was
necessary for the survival of the nation.238 Second, that an effective
common defense required that the federal government be permitted to
raise, support, and regulate armies and navies. 239 Having recognized
that these powers were essential to an effective defense, Hamilton
argued that the least dangerous place to vest those powers was in the
Congress :240
To the powers proposed to be conferred upon the federal gov-
236. See BEARD, supra note 202, at 32.
237. See supra notes 224-33 and accompanying text.
238. See THE FEDERALIST No. 23, at 145-46 (Alexander Hamilton) (Paul Leicester Ford ed.,
1918).
239. See id. at 145.
240. See id. at 147-48.
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ernment in respect to the creation and direction of the national forces,
I have met with but one specific objection.., that proper provision
has not been made against the existence of standing armies in time of
peace; an objection which, I shall now endeavor to show, rests on
weak and unsubstantial foundations.
' * * The propriety of this remark will appear the moment it is
recollected that the objection under consideration turns upon a sup-
posed necessity of restraining the LEGISLATIVE authority of the
nation, in the article of military establishments; a principle unheard
of, except in one or two of our State constitutions, and rejected in all
the rest.2 4 1
Thus, The Federalist Papers certainly support the view that the
Framers adopted Clause 14 in order to limit the dangers inherent in cre-
ating a standing federal army, by giving control over the military to the
Congress rather than to the President. There is, however, another possi-
bility that must be examined. The authors of The Federalist Papers
were, first and foremost, advocates. This means that every assertion
made in the various papers must be viewed in light of the authors' pri-
mary objective-to secure passage of the Constitution. As historian
Charles Beard has noted, the authors of The Federalist Papers were no
doubt patriotic and civic-minded Americans, but "[t]his is not to say that
they were never disingenuous, that they never 'shaded' their facts, or
that they never revealed any prejudices. ' 242 For instance, it is possible
that Hamilton never believed that congressional power over the military
was inherently less oppressive, but he might have latched onto that argu-
ment as a means of countering Anti-Federalist criticism of the Constitu-
tion. With regard to this matter, at least, it does not appear that
Hamilton's papers misrepresented the views of the Framers. The
pathetic military performance of the federal government under the Arti-
cles, and the obvious tendency throughout the Constitution to give
potentially oppressive powers to Congress, clearly corroborate Hamil-
ton's repeated assertions that the main purpose of Clause 14 was to allo-
cate military powers within the federal government.
As we have seen, the Convention offers little evidence as to the
substantive meaning of Clause 14-that provision having been added
without debate or objection.2 43 The Federalist Papers, in contrast to the
records of the Convention, give us the best, and nearly only, evidence of
the extent of the power the Framers intended to give Congress through
Clause 14. In Federalist Number 23, Alexander Hamilton's discussion
of Clause 14 completely forestalls any argument that the Framers did not
241. THE FEDERALIST No. 24, at 150 (Alexander Hamilton) (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1918).
242. BEARD, supra note 202, at 34.
243. See supra notes 230-35 and accompanying text.
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intend Congress' power to be plenary in this area. After asserting that
the federal government must be able to provide a common defense,
Hamilton set out the powers required to achieve that goal:
The authorities essential to the common defence are these: to
raise armies; to build and equip fleets; to prescribe rules for the gov-
ernment of both; to direct their operations; to provide for their sup-
port. These powers ought to exist without limitation, because it is
impossible to foresee or define the extent and variety of national exi-
gencies, or the correspondent extent and variety of the means which
may be necessary to satisfy them. The circumstances that endanger
the safety of nations are infinite, and for this reason no constitutional
shackles can wisely be imposed on the power to which the care of it
is committed. This power ought to be coextensive with all the possi-
ble combinations of such circumstances; and ought to be under the
direction of the same councils which are appointed to preside over
the common defense.
• ..And unless it can be shown that the circumstances which
may affect the public safety are reducible within certain determinable
limits; unless the contrary of this position can be fairly and rationally
disputed, it must be admitted, as a necessary consequence, that there
can be no limitation of that authority which is to provide for the
defence and protection of the community, in any matter essential to
its efficacy-that is, in any matter essential to the formation, direc-
tion, or support of the NATIONAL FORCES. 2 "
In two paragraphs, Hamilton provides a thorough and credible
statement of the Framers' intentions when they granted Congress the
power to raise, support, and regulate the armed forces. The first prem-
ise, that the federal government's power over the military should be ple-
nary, is necessary, according to Hamilton, because it was impossible for
the Framers to foresee in 1787 every possible turn of events that might
occur with the passage of time. Moreover, according to Hamilton, the
Constitution correctly provides that the war powers "ought to be under
the direction of the same councils who are appointed to preside over the
common defence. 245 Those councils are, of course, the two houses of
Congress. That notion dovetails nicely with Hamilton's argument in
Federalist Number 24 that the Constitution eliminated, or at least lim-
ited, the danger of federal oppression by denying the President control
over the army.2 46 Thus, to Hamilton, the power to regulate the armed
forces was vested in the Congress and was without limitation. It was for
244. THE FEDERALIST No. 23, at 145 (Alexander Hamilton) (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1918).
245. Id.
246. THE FEDERALIST No. 24, at 150-51 (Alexander Hamilton) (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1918).
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Congress, not for the states or other branches of the federal government,
to decide how best to deal with the "variety of national exigencies. '"247
While Hamilton makes this argument in The Federalist Papers, we
must return to an examination of his biases in determining the value of
his assertions. Was Hamilton giving an honest evaluation of Clause 14,
or was he "shading" his facts to win ratification of the Constitution?
Remember, Jay, Hamilton, and Madison penned The Federalist Papers
with one objective in mind-to counter Anti-Federalist propaganda
against the Constitution. That Anti-Federalist propaganda criticized the
extent of the federal powers created in the proposed Constitution, partic-
ularly those related to the authorization of a federal standing army. Typ-
ical of Anti-Federalist views, The Federal Farmer, likely a pseudonym
of Richard Henry Lee, expressed:
The general government, organized as it is, may be adequate to many
valuable objects, and be able to carry its laws into execution on
proper principles in several cases; but I think its warmest friends will
not contend, that it can carry all the powers proposed to be lodged in
it into effect, without calling into its aid a military force, which must
very soon destroy all elective governments in the country, produce
anarchy, or establish despotism."'
Pamphleteer Benjamin Workman, under the pseudonym Philadelphien-
sis, went one step further, and criticized the Constitution on the grounds
that Congress would have absolute control over the federal army:
But this consolidation of all the states into one general government,
renders this project [of building state navies] impossible; the federal
government having an unlimited power in taxation, which, no doubt,
they will exercise to the utmost; leaves the states without the means
of building even a boat. But had they the money, they dare not use it
for that purpose, for, Congress are to have an absolute power over the
standing army, navy, and militia.... 249
At first glance, the Philadelphiensis letter seems to confirm that at least
one leading opponent of the Constitution agreed with Hamilton that
Congress had an absolute control over the armed forces. But a closer
look at the two authors' biases makes this less certain. Philadelphiensis,
a virulent opponent of the proposed Constitution, had an incentive to
enhance his argument by overstating the dangers inherent in the Consti-
tution. Thus, it is possible that Philadelphiensis did not believe that
Congress had plenary control over the military, but that he made that
247. Id.
248. LETTER FROM THE "FEDERAL FARMER" TO THE REPUBLICAN (Oct. 9, 1787), reprinted in
THE ANTIFEDERALIST, supra note 225, at 213-14.
249. LETrER FROM "PHILADELPHIENSIS" (Dec. 12, 1787), reprinted in 1 THE DEBATE ON THE
CONSTITLrTON, supra note 225, at 497-98.
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assertion in his writings because it made for a forceful argument against
the Constitution.
On the other hand, Hamilton's objectives in writing Federalist
Number 23 only enhances the credibility of his argument. In countering
Anti-Federalist claims that unfettered federal control over the military
created the danger of despotism, Hamilton conceded the Anti-Federalist
interpretation of Clause 14. Hamilton admitted that the provision gave
Congress a plenary power to regulate the military, but downplayed the
potential for federal oppression.25° If the Framers believed that the Con-
stitution gave Congress anything less than plenary control over the
armed forces, then that would have been a strong argument why a fed-
eral standing army did not create a threat of oppression. Hamilton, how-
ever, never made such an argument. Instead, he made two related, but
weaker arguments. First, in Federalist Number 23, Hamilton argued
that the federal government had to have plenary control over the armed
forces.25' He based that argument on the military impotence of the fed-
eral government under the Articles of Confederation and upon the dan-
ger of restricting the war powers without an ability to foresee national
emergencies that might arise in the future.252 Then, in Federalist
Number 24, Hamilton argued that this plenary power was not dangerous
because it was vested in Congress and not in the President.253
In Federalist Number 23, Hamilton plainly asserted that Clause 14
grants Congress an absolute power to regulate the armed forces, and
then sets out to defend that grant of power. That assertion leaves open
two possibilities: (1) that Hamilton forthrightly spoke of the Framers'
intent for Clause 14; or (2) that Hamilton, ever the advocate, was shad-
ing the facts to curry support for the Constitution. The second possibil-
ity is clearly untenable. By conceding absolute congressional control
over the military, Hamilton would not have allayed fears of this new,
powerful federal government; he only would have fueled those fears.
Thus, by conceding that Clause 14 is a plenary grant of power, when a
Federalist advocate would have had an incentive to deny this plenary
grant, Hamilton's view of Clause 14 should be considered inherently
reliable.
Beyond giving substantive meaning to Clause 14, Hamilton's argu-
ment also makes a significant point about the value of historical practice
in interpreting constitutional powers. The O'Callahan Court created the
250. See generally THE FEDERALIST Nos. 23, 24 (Alexander Hamilton).
251. See THE FEDERALIST No. 23, at 146 (Alexander Hamilton) (Paul Leicester Ford ed.,
1918).
252. See id. at 145-46.
253. THE FEDERALIST No. 24, at 151 (Alexander Hamilton) (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1918).
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service-connection test after finding that the historical materials showed
a traditional aversion to military jurisdiction over civilian offenses. 254
Again, in Solorio,255 the Court overruled O'Callahan, not by denying
the value of historical analysis, but by finding the historical materials
too ambiguous to justify departure from the plain language of Clause
14.256 Historical practice certainly has value in constitutional interpreta-
tion because it demonstrates the context in which the Framers drafted
the Constitution. From that context, we can formulate opinions about
the intent of the Framers who drafted and ratified the Constitution.
However, in the case of Clause 14, the Framers themselves seemed to
have signalled that historical practice would be irrelevant. As Hamilton
stated in Federalist Number 23, the Framers wanted Clause 14 to be
flexible, with Congress having the power to change its regulatory prac-
tices with the times. 57 Where, as with Clause 14, the Framers acknowl-
edged that a grant of power should be flexible enough to allow the
recipient of that power to meet the exigencies of an uncertain future,
then historical practice at the time the Framers drafted the Constitution
is of little value in assessing original intent.
IV. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT ON CLAUSE 14 AND OTHER
WAR POWERS
Thus far, the analysis provides that Justice Stevens is technically
correct when he asserts in Loving v. United States258 that Congress has,
at times, treated death penalty jurisdiction differently than jurisdiction
over non-capital offenses. 259 Nevertheless, a closer examination of the
historical materials demonstrates that court-martial jurisdiction has
steadily evolved from a bare-bones death penalty jurisdiction to the pres-
ent state, where death penalty jurisdiction is as broad as the jurisdiction
over any other offense.260 Thus, there are definite problems with the
conclusions Justice Stevens draws from the historical materials, not the
least of which is that, to the extent there has been different treatment of
death penalty jurisdiction, it has not centered around the service-connec-
tion test.26' As discussed, all evidence from the constitutional era sug-
gests that the Framers fully intended Congress to have the unfettered
254. See O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 268 (1969), overruled by Solorio v. United
States, 483 U.S. 435 (1987).
255. 483 U.S. 435 (1987).
256. See id. at 445.
257. THE FEDERALIST No. 23, at 145 (Alexander Hamilton) (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1918).
258. 116 S. Ct. 1737 (1996).
259. See id. at 1751.
260. See supra text accompanying notes 167-72.
261. See supra notes 186-90 and accompanying text.
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power to regulate the military it raised and supported.2 62 That analysis
might seem to foreclose Justice Stevens' position; however, there is
more. There is a large body of case law bearing on the substantive inter-
pretation of Clause 14. The Supreme Court never writes on an empty
slate and precedent must be duly considered.263
Supreme Court cases bearing on court-martial jurisdiction fall into
four general categories. Because Justice Stevens' concurrence in Loving
challenges Congress' power to set subject-matter jurisdiction, cases
bearing on that issue are of paramount importance. The second pertinent
category involves cases where the Court, while not considering issues of
subject-matter jurisdiction, has explicitly deferred to Congress' judg-
ment in its regulation of the armed forces. The third group is more spe-
cific than the deference cases, and consists of cases interpreting Clause
14, but not necessarily speaking to court-martial jurisdiction. The final
category are the cases discussed earlier dealing with the personal juris-
diction of courts-martial and the differences between Congress' power
over personal jurisdiction and its power over subject-matter jurisdiction.
In each of these categories, the Supreme Court cases clearly support the
proposition that the courts have no role in second-guessing Congress'
determination of the appropriate subject-matter jurisdiction of courts-
martial.
A. The Subject-Matter Jurisdiction Cases
During the past one hundred fifty years, the Supreme Court has
heard a great number of cases challenging various aspects of courts-
martial, and has rejected the vast majority of those claims. Many cases
have addressed the constitutionality of personal jurisdiction over various
civilians and quasi-civilians. 2 1 Others have been subject-matter juris-
diction claims based on statutory interpretation. For example, in Kahn v.
Anderson,2 65 the petitioner claimed his court-martial lacked subject mat-
ter jurisdiction because Congress had given courts-martial jurisdiction
over domestic murder in time of war only, and the accused had commit-
262. See supra notes 202-57 and accompanying text.
263. See, e.g., Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 452 (1957) ("If this ruling
is unrealistic, inconsistent, or illogical, it is sufficient to answer, aside from the distinctions
between the businesses, that were we considering the question ... for the first time upon a clean
slate we would have no doubts." (footnote omitted)).
264. See, e.g., Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278 (1960) (civilian employees); McElroy v.
Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960) (same); Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234
(1960) (servicemembers' dependents); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (same); United States ex
rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955) (discharged soldiers); Exparte Reed, 100 U.S. 13 (1879)
(civilian clerk to naval paymaster).
265. 255 U.S. 1 (1921).
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ted his offense after the cessation of hostilities.266 The Court rejected
Kahn's claim, holding that the statute permitted jurisdiction any time
prior to a complete, legal peace, even if open fighting had ceased.267 In
any event, cases dealing with whether a court-martial exceeded the sub-
ject-matter jurisdiction Congress created have no bearing on the issues
confronted in this article. Kahn, and cases like it, challenge whether
Congress has created jurisdiction, not whether Congress can create the
jurisdiction that was exercised in a particular case. In fact, the Court
never ruled in a case challenging the constitutionality of a particular sub-
ject-matter jurisdiction until 1969, when it decided O'Callahan.268
When evaluating precedent to determine whether Justice Stevens is cor-
rect, it is logical to begin at the source, with an examination of
O'Callahan and Solorio.
In O'Callahan, the petitioner, an army sergeant on authorized lib-
erty, had broken into the hotel room of a young girl, assaulted her, and
attempted to rape her.269 After describing the procedural history of the
case, the Court contrasted the rights afforded to court-martial accuseds
and the rights of defendants in civilian courts. A soldier facing trial by
court-martial has no right to a grand jury indictment or the right to a trial
by a jury of his peers.27° At the time of O'Callahan's trial, courts-mar-
tial did not have judges, and those performing judicial functions at
courts-martial had no fixed term of office.27' The Court also opined that
"military tribunals have not been and probably never can be constituted
in such a way that they can have the same kind of qualifications that the
Constitution has deemed essential to fair trials of civilians in federal
courts. '' 272 Having established its view that courts-martial were less pro-
tective of defendants' rights than civilian courts, the O'Callahan Court
next examined the history of court-martial jurisdiction in England and
the United States. That history, according to the majority, demonstrated
an historical aversion to court-martial jurisdiction over civilian-type
offenses.273 The Court took these three premises-the overall inferiority
of courts-martial, the inferior rights afforded a court-martial accused,
and a historical preference that civilian crimes be tried in civilian
courts-and determined that Congress could only create court-martial
266. See id. at 9.
267. See id. at 10. The Court later came to the opposite conclusion in Lee v. Madigan, 358
U.S. 228, 236 (1959).
268. 395 U.S. 258 (1969), overruled by Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435 (1987).
269. See O'Callahan, 395 U.S. at 259-60.
270. See id. at 261-62.
271. See id. at 263.
272. Id. at 262-63.
273. See id. at 268-71.
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
jurisdiction over crimes that were service-connected.274
Before O'Callahan, there had been no subject-matter constraints on
court-martial jurisdiction. If the accused was a member of the "land and
naval forces," and his conduct violated the UCMJ, then a court-martial
had jurisdiction. It was irrelevant whether the offense was capital or
non-capital. After O'Callahan, offenses were triable by court-martial
only if the accused was a servicemember, his offense violated the
UCMJ, and the facts of his alleged offense made the crime service-con-
nected. Just as it had been before O'Callahan, the jurisdiction of courts-
martial after O'Callahan did not hinge on whether the offense was capi-
tal or non-capital; the same jurisdictional test applied to both types of
crimes.
In Solorio, the majority's analysis followed a very different path
than that taken by the O'Callahan Court. After describing the facts of
the case and its procedural history, the Court began with the premise that
Congress was granted the power under Clause 14 to establish the juris-
diction of courts-martial. 275 The Court then noted that until O'Callahan,
the Court had repeatedly interpreted the Constitution as placing only one
limitation on Congress' power to create court-martial jurisdiction: the
accused, by virtue of his status, must be personally amenable to trial by
court-martial.276 Beyond citing the wealth of precedent on this issue, the
Court noted that the status test, unlike the service-connection test of
O'Callahan, comported with the plain meaning of Clause 14.277 After
describing the decision in O'Callahan, the Court announced that "[o]n
reexamination of O'Callahan, we have decided that the service connec-
tion test announced in that decision should be abandoned. 278
The Solorio Court justified its holding on several grounds. First,
the plain meaning of Clause 14 imposed no limitations on Congress'
power to regulate members of the armed forces.279 Second, the Court
could find no support in the debates over the Constitution for deviating
from Clause 14's plain meaning.28 ° Third, the Court took issue with the
O'Callahan Court's characterization of historical practice. 28 ' The
Solorio majority did not interpret the historical materials to support con-
274. See id. at 273-74.
275. See Solorio, 483 U.S. at 438.
276. Id. at 439 ("In an unbroken line of decisions from 1866 to 1960, this Court interpreted the
Constitution as conditioning the proper exercise of court-martial jurisdiction over an offense on
one factor: the military status of the accused.").
277. See id. at 440-41.
278. Id.
279. See id. at 441.
280. See id.
281. See id. at 442.
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stitutional limits on Congress' power over courts-martial.282 Instead, the
Court found that "the history of court-martial jurisdiction in England
and in this country during the 17th and 18th centuries is far too ambigu-
ous to justify the restriction on the plain language of Clause 14 which
O'Callahan imported into it." '283 Fourth, the Court stated that the judici-
ary, unlike Congress, is "ill equipped" to determine appropriate policies
for governing the military and, as such, should give Congress wide berth
in regulating the armed forces.28" Finally, the Court examined the expe-
rience under the O'Callahan rule, and found the service-connection test
confusing and unworkable. 85
From an examination of O'Callahan and Solorio, it becomes clear
that neither was decided on capital/non-capital grounds. O'Callahan, a
case dealing with non-capital offenses, created a service-connection test
applicable to all offenses, whether capital or not. The Solorio Court, by
its own terms, eradicated the test created in O'Callahan. The Solorio
majority never mentioned that the offenses at issue-a variety of "inde-
cent liberties, lascivious acts, and indecent assaults" 28 6-were of the
non-capital variety. From the various opinions, there is no indication
that any one of the Justices based their vote on the punishment author-
ized for the offenses. Justice Stevens, concurring in the result, opined
that the Court should not have overruled O'Callahan, and should have
based its decision on the narrower ground that jurisdiction was permissi-
ble because Solorio's offenses were service-connected.2 87 The Solorio
dissenters-Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun-also did not
treat the severity of the charged offenses as having any constitutional
significance. 88 According to the dissent, the O'Callahan Court had it
right-all offenses, capital and non-capital, had to be service-connected
for jurisdiction to be constitutional.289
Thus, neither O'Callahan, the case creating the service-connection
test, nor Solorio, the case destroying that test, have even one sentence in
their majority opinions suggesting that the severity of the punishment is
of any jurisdictional significance. Neither case even mentions whether
the charged offenses were capital crimes. It appears from Loving that
282. See id. at 446 ("But such disapproval in England at the time of William and Mary hardly
proves that the Framers of the Constitution, contrary to the plenary language in which they
conferred the power on Congress, meant to freeze court-martial usage at a particular time in such a
way that Congress might not change it.").
283. Id. at 445 (footnote omitted).
284. See id. at 447-48.
285. See id. at 449-50.
286. Id. at 437 n.1.
287. See id. at 451 (Stevens, J., concurring).
288. See id. at 452 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
289. See id. at 461-63.
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the four concurring Justices might prefer to limit Solorio strictly to its
facts. It is true that Solorio was a non-capital case; nevertheless, the
Court's holding was not punishment-dependent. O'Callahan's service-
connection test, applicable to all offenses whether capital or not, was
overruled in Solorio in no uncertain words: "On reexamination of
O'Callahan, we have decided that the service connection test announced
in that decision should be abandoned. '290 Therefore, the Court would
have to be extremely dexterous, if not disingenuous, to revive a service-
connection test for death penalty cases without acknowledging that it is
overruling at least part of Solorio. Of course, that is not to say that the
Court will not do just that, just as Solorio explicitly overruled
O 'Callahan.
There are, however, compelling reasons why the Court should not,
and likely will not, resurrect the O'Callahan test for capital offenses.
Several of those reasons have already been discussed. There is no his-
torical support for constitutional limits on death penalty jurisdiction.
The plain language of Clause 14 does not differentiate between capital
and non-capital offenses. Additionally, the evidence of original intent
points strongly toward the conclusion that Clause 14 grants Congress a
plenary power in this area. Moreover, an analysis of the case law con-
sidering the appropriate roles of Congress and the judiciary in oversee-
ing military law demonstrates that the Court would have to disregard, if
not overrule, a tremendous body of case law if it were to strike down
any portion of the subject-matter jurisdiction enacted by Congress pur-
suant to Clause 14.
B. Judicial Deference to Congress in Military Matters
The concept of judicial deference to military decisions first
appeared in Martin v. Mott,291 a case dating back to 1827. Martin dealt
with a statute by which Congress gave the President the power to call
out the militia if the United States was faced with imminent invasion. 92
President Madison called out the New York militia pursuant to this grant
of authority in 1814 to aid the standing army in the War of 1812.293
Mott did not join the militia as required, and defended at his court-mar-
tial on the grounds that the President's order was illegal because there
was no national emergency.294 The Supreme Court rejected Mott's
claim, holding that it was for the President to decide whether a national
290. Id. at 440-41.
291. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19 (1827).
292. See id. at 29.
293. See id. at 20.
294. See id. at 20-23.
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emergency existed, and that the courts were not to second-guess that
determination.295 It must be noted that this case does not deal with def-
erence to Congress; it is about deferring to the President's determina-
tions. Also, Martin v. Mott is a case about statutory interpretation and
not constitutional interpretation. Nevertheless, this case is the genesis of
themes that repeat themselves through 150 years of congressional defer-
ence cases.
The first such theme is the reality of military service. An effective
military requires that soldiers unhesitatingly obey the orders of their
superiors. If courts could review the President's determination that a
national emergency existed, the President would lose his ability to
respond to such emergencies because any citizen who preferred not to
serve could delay his call to arms by filing suit. "The service is a mili-
tary service, and the command of a military nature; and in such cases,
every delay, and every obstacle to an efficient and immediate compli-
ance, necessarily tend to jeopard the public interests." '96 This recogni-
tion that military service differs from civilian life has caused the Court
to give Congress and the President wide latitude in fashioning rules that,
when applied to the civilian populace, might not withstand a constitu-
tional challenge.
An excellent example of this phenomenon is Feres v. United
States.29 7 That case interpreted the Federal Tort Claims Act,298 which
grants persons injured through the negligence of government employees
the right to sue the federal government for damages.2 99 The plain lan-
guage of the Act did not prohibit recovery by injured ser-
vicemembers. 30 0  The Court held in Feres, however, that
servicemembers could not collect under the Federal Tort Claims Act for
any injury related to their military service.3 1 The Court reasoned that a
soldier has a different relationship with the federal government than
does an ordinary citizen; that relationship is primarily federal in charac-
ter, and it would be inappropriate to allow state tort law to govern a
soldier's negligence claim. 30 2 The Court later explained the Feres doc-
trine as follows:
In the last analysis, Feres seems best explained by the "peculiar and
295. See id. at 30.
296. Id.
297. 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
298. Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1994).
299. See Feres, 340 U.S. at 138.
300. See id. at 140-41 ("[T]he Act goes on to prescribe the test of allowable claims, which is,
'The United States shall be liable ... in the same manner and to the same extent as a private
individual under like circumstances .... ') (alteration in original).
301. See id. at 146.
302. See id. at 143-44.
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special relationship of the soldier to his superiors, the effects of the
maintenance of such suits on discipline, and the extreme results that
might obtain if suits under the Tort Claims Act were allowed for
negligent orders given or negligent acts committed in the course of
military duty. .. .303
The "military is different" justification for deference to the political
branches also can be seen in a series of First Amendment cases. In
Parker v. Levy, 3°4 the Court rejected a First Amendment challenge to
Article 133 of the UCMJ, which prohibits conduct unbecoming an
officer and a gentleman. 30 5 Captain Levy, a Vietnam-era Army physi-
cian, was convicted of violating Article 133 for urging soldiers on his
base to refuse orders to Vietnam and to refuse to fight if sent to Viet-
nam. 30 6 The Court held that the nature of military service required that
Levy's conduct be held to a different standard than that of civilians:
"While members of the military community enjoy many of the same
rights and bear many of the same burdens as do members of the civilian
community, within the military community there is simply not the same
autonomy as there is in the larger civilian community. 30 7 In Brown v.
Glines,3 °8 the Court held that the different First Amendment rights of
servicemembers permitted a prohibition on distributing petitions on
base, where such an activity clearly would be protected off base.30 9
Similarly, in Goldman v. Weinberger,31 the Court held that the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment did not give an Air Force chap-
303. United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 162 (1963) (quoting United States v. Brown, 348
U.S. 110, 112 (1954)).
304. 417 U.S. 733 (1974).
305. Id.
306. See id. at 736-37. Specifically, Captain Levy made statements such as the following to
enlisted soldiers aboard base:
The United States is wrong in being involved in the Viet Nam War. I would refuse
to go to Viet Nam if ordered to do so. I don't see why any colored soldier would go
to Viet Nam: they should refuse to go to Vietnam or if sent refuse to fight because
they are discriminated against and denied their freedom in the United States, and
they are sacrificed and discriminated against in Viet Nam by being given all the
hazardous duty and they are suffering the majority of casualties. If I were a colored
soldier I would refuse to go to Viet Nam and if I were a colored soldier and were
sent I would refuse to fight. Special Forces personnel are liars and thieves and
killers of peasants and murderers of women and children.
Id.
307. Id. at 751.
308. 444 U.S. 348 (1980).
309. See id. at 354 ("Thus, while members of the military services are entitled to the
protections of the First Amendment, 'the different character of the military community and of the
military mission requires a different application of those protections."' (quoting Parker, 417 U.S.
at 758)).
310. 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
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lain the right to wear a yarmulke in uniform."' 1
Another theme relied upon by the Court in Martin v. Mott was the
lack of judicially cognizable standards in determining whether a national
emergency existed, or whether the President reasonably believed such an
emergency existed. The President, unlike the judiciary or the individual
servicemember, has access to sensitive military intelligence, and is in a
better position than the courts to determine whether an invasion or other
emergency is imminent.312 This point was most starkly made in Kore-
matsu v. United States,3 13 where the Court denied relief to Asian-Ameri-
cans interned during World War II.314 The Court asserted that the
political branches and the military had the best access to information
justifying this most extreme action.315 Justice Frankfurter perhaps best
summed up the Court's stance in his concurring opinion: "To find that
the Constitution does not forbid the military measures now complained
of does not carry with it approval of that which Congress and the Execu-
tive did. That is their business, not ours." '316 In Gilligan v. Morgan,317
the Court recognized that the judiciary is less able than the political
branches to make informed policy decisions for the armed forces.3 8
The courts, unlike Congress and the President, cannot commission pol-
icy studies, hold fact-finding hearings, or create committees to become
experts on difficult policy matters. In Gilligan, the Court rejected chal-
lenges to the training and tactics of the Ohio National Guard, a suit aris-
ing in the aftermath of the Kent State tragedy. In deferring to the
political branches, the Court stated:
[I]t is difficult to conceive of an area of governmental activity in
which the courts have less competence. The complex, subtle, and
professional decisions as to the composition, training, equipping, and
control of a military force are essentially professional military judg-
ments, subject always to civilian control of the Legislative and Exec-
utive Branches. The ultimate responsibility for these decisions is
appropriately vested in the branches of the government which are
periodically subject to electoral accountability. It is this power of
311. See id. at 510.
312. See Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19 (1827). The Court stated that:
[T]he evidence upon which the President might decide that there is imminent danger
of invasion, might be of a nature not constituting strict technical proof, or the
disclosure of the evidence might reveal important secrets of state, which the public
interest, and even safety, might imperiously demand to be kept in concealment.
Id. at 31.
313. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
314. Id.
315. See id. at 218-19.
316. Id. at 225 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
317. 413 U.S. 1 (1973).
318. Id.
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oversight and control of military force by elected representatives and
officials which underlies our entire constitutional system .... 319
Recognizing that Congress and the President have greater fact-finding
capabilities, whether it be their ability to gather intelligence, hold hear-
ings, or consult the Pentagon, the Court has often declared that it is by
comparison incompetent to determine the needs of the military services,
or the impact any action might have on national readiness. In Chappell
v. Wallace,32 ° the Court explicitly confessed that "courts are ill-equipped
to determine the impact upon discipline that any particular intrusion
upon military authority might have." 32 '
A final theme justifying deference first appeared in the 1849 case
of Wilkes v. Dinsman.322 Dinsman was a Marine stationed aboard a
naval vessel surveying the Pacific Ocean and South Seas.323 While on
the surveying expedition, Dinsman claimed to have completed his enlist-
ment and refused to follow orders.32" The squadron commander,
Wilkes, ordered Dinsman flogged, placed in irons, and imprisoned in an
Oahu jail.3 25 Dinsman sued Commander Wilkes, claiming, among other
things, that the punishment inflicted was illegal. The Court disposed of
Dinsman's assertion, holding that Congress had given naval com-
manders authority to flog their men without court-martial proceedings,
and that it was within Wilkes' discretion to imprison Dinsman rather
than to risk the spread of his mutinous behavior.3 26 The Court noted that
the law gave Commander Wilkes the discretion to take appropriate
measures while commanding his surveying squadron, and that it would
be inappropriate to leave those decisions open to judicial review.
"Hence, while an officer acts within the limits of that discretion, the
same law which gives it to him will protect him in the exercise of it."'327
Thus, Wilkes reiterates a point made in Martin v. Mott-the need for
unflinching obedience within the ranks counsels against judicial relief
for those who disobey orders. Wilkes also speaks to the allocation of
powers. The power to punish Dinsman's actions had been vested in
319. Id. at 10.
320. 462 U.S. 296 (1983).
321. Id. at 305 (quoting Earl Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV.
181, 187 (1962)). The Court has made similar statements in Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S.
503, 507-08 (1986) (holding that the Court would defer to Air Force's determination that
chaplains may not wear yarmulkes in uniform), and Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S.
518, 529-30 (1988) (refusing to second-guess Navy's determination to classify respondent as a
security risk).
322. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 89 (1849).
323. See id. at 91-92.
324. See id. at 92.
325. See id. at 104.
326. See id. at 126-30.
327. Id. at 129.
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Commander Wilkes; therefore, the Court reasoned Commander Wilkes
must be given the discretion to make choices about the exercise of that
power. The theme also arises regarding Congress' war powers.328
The Court has time and time again justified deference to Congress,
by relying on Congress' constitutional grants of power to regulate the
armed forces with no explicit restrictions. Typical of this view is the
Court's statement in Hirabayashi v. United States:329
Since the Constitution commits to the Executive and to Congress the
exercise of the war power in all the vicissitudes and conditions of
warfare, it has necessarily given them wide scope for the exercise of
judgment and discretion in determining the nature and extent of the
threatened injury or danger and in the selection of the means for
resisting it. Where, as they did here, the conditions call for the exer-
cise of judgment and discretion and for the choice of means by those
branches of the Government on which the Constitution has placed the
responsibility for war-making, it is not for any court to sit in review
of the wisdom of their action or substitute its judgment for theirs.33°
Similarly, in Burns v. Wilson,331 the Court explicitly deferred to Con-
gress in a case dealing with various evidentiary and constitutional claims
arising from court-martial proceedings. 332 The Court quickly disposed
of these issues, holding that the petitioners had not demonstrated why
their claims could not be treated adequately by the trial court and the
military appellate courts. The Court once again made reference to the
Constitution's granting of power over courts-martial to Congress, not the
judiciary:
Military law, like state law, is a jurisprudence which exists separate
and apart from the law which governs in our federal judicial estab-
lishment. This Court has played no role in its development; we have
exerted no supervisory power over the courts which enforce it; the
rights of men in the armed forces must perforce be conditioned to
meet certain overriding demands of discipline and duty, and the civil
courts are not the agencies which must determine the precise balance
to be struck in this adjustment. The Framers expressly entrusted that
task to Congress.333
328. This stWain of analysis, that Congress has the unfettered discretion to select the appropriate
means of accomplishing powers granted it by the Constitution, arguably has its roots in the great
case of McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). In that case, the Court held that
Congress, in pursuing its constitutionally-granted powers to collect taxes, borrow money, and
regulate commerce, had the discretion to create a national bank to facilitate exercise of those
powers. See id. at 322-26.
329. 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
330. Id. at 93 (citations omitted).
331. 346 U.S. 137 (1953).
332. Id.
333. Id. at 140 (footnotes omitted).
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It should be noted that at the time of the Bums decision, courts-
martial were not appealable to the Supreme Court except by writ of
habeas corpus. Thus, when the Bums Court stated that it had no super-
visory control over military justice, that was in fact true at the time. The
Military Justice Act of 1983 changed that, by giving accuseds the oppor-
tunity to petition for certiorari in any case reviewed by the Court of
Appeals for the Armed Forces. 3 34  Nevertheless, the tenor of Bums
remains unchanged. The Constitution granted Congress the power to
create an appropriate court-martial system, and the Court has indicated
repeatedly that it will respect those policy judgments.335
In more recent cases, the Court has been apt to spend little time
explaining how the facts of a particular case make the court ill-equipped
to make an informed ruling, and to rely instead on the Constitution's
grant of regulatory power to Congress. For instance, in Weiss v. United
States,336 the Court had no difficulty holding that the due process test for
military law is much more lenient than that for civilian laws, requiring
the Court to consider "whether factors militating in favor of [the ser-
vicemember's position] are so extraordinarily weighty as to overcome
the balance struck by Congress. '337  The Weiss Court also relied on a
334. See Military Justice Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-209, § 10, 97 Stat. 1393, 1405-06
(codified as UNIF. CODE OF MIL. JUST. art. 67(a), 10 U.S.C. § 867(a) (1994)).
335. In Middendorfv. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 43 (1976), the Court held that the Constitution did
not require a right to counsel for summary court-martial proceedings. A summary court-martial is
a trial where one officer is appointed to gather the facts, both for those and against an accused,
subject to the Military Rules of Evidence, and to make findings as to guilt and, if necessary, as to
an appropriate sentence, which cannot exceed thirty days confinement. See UNIF. CODE OF MIR.
JUST., art. 20, 10 U.S.C. § 820 (1994). In so holding, the Court stated that "[i]n making such an
analysis we must give particular deference to the determination of Congress, made under its
authority to regulate the land and naval forces, that counsel should not be provided." Middendorf,
425 U.S. at 43 (citation omitted).
The Court also held that a former servicemember cannot maintain a tort action against the
government for the government's secret administration of LSD to him, again relying on the
Constitution's grant of regulatory power to Congress:
The Court also held that a former servicemember cannot maintain a tort action
against the government for the government's secret administration of LSD to him,
again relying on the Constitution's grant of regulatory power to Congress:
What is distinctive here is the specificity of [Clause 14,] that technically superfluous
grant of power, and the insistence (evident from the number of Clauses devoted to
the subject) with which the Constitution confers authority over the Army, Navy, and
militia upon the political branches. ...
... The "special factor" that "counsels hesitation" is not the fact that Congress
has chosen to afford some manner of relief in the particular case, but the fact that
congressionally uninvited intrusion into military affairs by the judiciary is
inappropriate.
United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 682-83 (1987) (footnote omitted).
336. 510 U.S. 163 (1994).
337. Id. at 177-78 (quoting Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 44 (1976)).
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judicial maxim that has appeared repeatedly in military cases over the
last half-century: "Judicial deference. .. 'is at its apogee' when review-
ing congressional decisionmaking in this area. "338
While the concept of judicial deference does not mean that all judi-
cial review is foreclosed to servicemembers, its recent elevation from a
pragmatic philosophy to a dogmatic rule of law demonstrates that, in the
Court's eyes, Congress is to be the primary arbiter of military issues.
The deference cases do not eliminate the role of courts in protecting
servicemembers' rights, but they certainly reduce the likelihood that an
accused can rely on civilian case law for any type of relief. Taking the
issue of service-connection test for death penalty cases, the deference
cases paint a dim picture for the accused members of the military.
Black-letter law indicates that Congress has the benefit of judicial defer-
ence based upon its constitutionally-conferred role in regulating the mil-
itary. Beyond that, the logic underlying the notion of judicial deference
applies fully to this issue. The reasoning behind the O'Callahan doc-
trine was the notion from United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles339 that
courts-martial jurisdiction should be limited to the narrowest jurisdiction
possible consistent with the needs of the military.340 The cases since
Toth, and particularly since O'Callahan, make clear that even if that
maxim were true, the Court has determined that the balance is to be
struck by Congress and not by the courts. 3 41' Not only has Congress
been entrusted with that task by the Constitution, it also is in a far better
position to determine when, if at all, certain crimes may be excluded
from military jurisdiction without affecting good order and discipline.342
C. Substantive Analysis of Clause 14: The "Plenary Power" Cases
Deference can be viewed as the notion that the Court will side with
Congress in close cases. More cynically, it might be seen as a means of
justifying any enactment the Justices have no qualms with from a policy
standpoint. Either way, it is a thin reed to lean upon as a matter of
constitutional argument, because deference can be highly unpredictable.
One can never be sure when the Court will say that deference is inappro-
338. Id. at 177 (quoting Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 70 (1981)). See also Loving v.
United States, 116 S. Ct. 1737, 1748 (1996) ("[W]e give Congress the highest deference in
ordering military affairs."); Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 530 (1988) ("Thus,
unless Congress specifically has provided otherwise, courts traditionally have been reluctant to
intrude upon the authority of the Executive in military and national security affairs."); Solorio v.
United States, 483 U.S. 435, 447 (1987) (noting that "[j]udicial deference ... is at its apogee");
Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 508 (1986) (same).
339. 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
340. See id. at 23.
341. See supra notes 336-38 and accompanying text.
342. See supra notes 312-21 and accompanying text.
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priate, or when the Court will not find the case a close enough call to
side with the Congress.34 3 There have been several cases, however,
where the Court has gone beyond its traditional paean to deference and
made explicit statements regarding the extent of Congress' powers under
Clause 14. A review of that body of authority demonstrates that when
Congress has sought to regulate actual members of the armed forces, the
Court has repeatedly stated that Clause 14 is a plenary grant of power,
making judicial interference like that proposed by Justice Stevens
wholly inappropriate.
The Supreme Court's first statement about the substantive meaning
of Clause 14 came in the case of Dynes v. Hoover.3 4 In that case,
Dynes had been tried for desertion, convicted of attempted desertion,
and sentenced to imprisonment.345 Dynes sued, alleging false imprison-
ment on the grounds that his sentence was illegal and void.3 46  In
rejecting Dynes' contention, the Court first remarked that courts-martial
are not part of the judicial power of the United States. 347 Responding to
Congress' power to establish courts-martial, the Court stated that it "is
given without any connection between it and the 3d article of the Consti-
tution. '3 48 Even given that courts-martial were not, at that time, appeal-
able to civilian courts, 349 the Court, for the first time, intimated that
there were no substantive restrictions on Congress' power to establish
and regulate courts-martial:
With the sentences of courts martial which have been convened regu-
larly, and have proceeded legally, and by which punishments are
directed, not forbidden by law, or which are according to the laws
and customs of the sea, civil courts have nothing to do, nor are they
in any way alterable by them. If it were otherwise, the civil courts
would virtually administer the rules and articles of war, irrespective
of those to whom that duty and obligation has been confided by the
laws of the United States, from whose decisions no appeal or jurisdic-
343. This unpredictability of judicial deference certainly affects the manner in which military
appellate counsel present argument on constitutional issues. Cynically, but somewhat justifiably,
it has been said that the government presents the same argument before the appellate courts in
every case where constitutional error has been alleged:
(1) The trial judge was right; there was no error;
(2) If there was error, it was waived by failure to object at trial;
(3) If there was error, it was harmless error; and as a last resort
(4) The military is different, meaning you have to disregard civilian case law, so
there really was no error in the first place.
344. 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65 (1857).
345. See id. at 77.
346. See id. at 78.
347. See id. at 79.
348. Id.
349. It was not until 1983 that Congress authorized appeal of courts-martial by way of petition
for certiorari to the Supreme Court. See supra note 334 and accompanying text.
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tion of any kind has been given to the civil magistrate or civil
courts.3 5 0
While the Dynes Court had suggested that Congress' power to reg-
ulate the armed forces was plenary, the Court expressly stated as much
two decades later in Coleman v. Tennessee.351  Recall that Coleman
addressed the 1863 statute granting courts-martial jurisdiction over com-
mon-law felonies committed in time of war.352 Coleman argued that this
statute deprived state courts of concurrent jurisdiction over such
crimes-an assertion the Court flatly rejected. 3  In so holding, the
Court also stated that Congress had the power to deprive state courts of
concurrent jurisdiction, but had not done so in the 1863 statute. 354 The
Court justified that notion by resort to Clause 14:
As Congress is expressly authorized by the Constitution "to raise and
support armies," and "to make rules for the government and regula-
tion of the land and naval forces," its control over the whole subject
of the formation, organization, and government of the national
armies, including therein the punishment of offenses committed by
persons in the military service, would seem to be plenary.3 55
Just a year later, the Court stated in Ex parte Reed 356 that "[t]he constitu-
tionality of the acts of Congress touching army and navy courts-martial
in this country, if there could ever have been a doubt about it, is no
longer an open question in this court. ' 3 57 Thus, when Justice Stevens
asserts in Loving that case law has not established that death penalty
jurisdiction must be as broad as non-capital jurisdiction, he makes some-
thing of a curious argument.358 It is true that the Court has never ruled
in a death penalty case where the issue was whether the crime must be
service-connected. Over a century ago, however, the Court interpreted
Clause 14, the provision under which Congress creates court-martial
jurisdiction, to be a plenary grant of power to Congress.359
The Court's explicit statements that Clause 14 creates a plenary
power did not stop with Dynes and Reed. In 1950, the Court heard argu-
ments in Whelchel v. McDonald.36 ° In that case, Whelchel had been
350. Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65, 82 (1857) (emphasis added).
351. 97 U.S. 509 (1878).
352. See supra notes 89-92 and accompanying text for a more complete discussion of the facts
in Coleman.
353. See Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U.S. 509, 514 (1878).
354. See id. at 514.
355. Id.
356. 100 U.S. 13 (1879).
357. Id. at 21.
358. See Loving v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1737, 1751 (1996) (Stevens, J., concurring).
359. See supra notes 344-57 and accompanying text.
360. 340 U.S. 122 (1950).
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convicted of rape while on active duty in Germany."' The jury was
comprised completely of military officers.3 62 After Whelchel's trial,
Congress amended Article 4 of the Army Articles of War, and thereby
granted servicemembers the right to request that enlisted soldiers be
included in the jury.3 63 Whelchel appealed his conviction on the
grounds that he was denied his right to have a jury composed of officers
and enlisted soldiers. 64 The Court rejected that notion, holding that the
Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial did not apply to courts-martial,
and that Congress had not created the right to enlisted members at the
time of Whelchel's trial.365 Ominously, the Court summed up its view
of the judiciary's role in overseeing the court-martial system created by
Congress, stating that "[t]he constitution of courts-martial, like other
matters relating to their organization and administration, is a matter
appropriate for congressional action." '366 While the Whelchel Court
made no broad pronouncement about Congress' power under Clause 14,
the plenary nature of that power is implicit in the Court's holding. The
Court treated its role as ensuring that the court-martial did not deviate
from the jurisdiction and procedures created by Congress. That was the
end of the inquiry. The last sentence of the opinion, quoted above, made
clear that persons unhappy with the court-martial system created by
Congress should take that up with Congress and not with the courts. 3 6 7
Perhaps the strongest statement of the breadth of Clause 14 can be
found in Chappell v. Wallace.36 8 In that case, the Court ruled that
enlisted sailors had no right to bring a civil rights suit against their supe-
rior officers for alleged racial discrimination in duty assignments and
performance evaluations.3 69 The Court based its holding on the special
nature of military service, and the detrimental effect the potential of civil
litigation would have on national defense and military readiness.37 °
After recognizing these pragmatic concerns, the Court went on to char-
acterize Congress' power over the armed forces:
Many of the Framers of the Constitution had recently experienced the
361. See id. at 123.
362. See id. at 126.
363. See id. at 126 & n.6.
364. See id. at 126-27. Whelchel also appealed on the grounds that the court-martial lacked
jurisdiction because it had erroneously evaluated evidence suggesting Whelchel was legally
insane. The Court found that contention without merit. See id. at 125-26.
365. See id. at 127.
366. Id. (citations omitted).
367. See also Bums v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 147 (1953) (Minton, J., concurring) ("Due
process of law for military personnel is what Congress has provided for them in the military
hierarchy in courts established according to law.").
368. 462 U.S. 296 (1983).
369. See id. at 304.
370. See id. at 298-300.
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rigors of military life and were well aware of the differences between
it and civilian life. In drafting the Constitution they anticipated the
kinds of issues raised in this case. Their response was an explicit
grant of plenary authority "To raise and support Armies"; "To pro-
vide and maintain a Navy"; and "To make Rules for the Government
and Regulation of the land and naval Forces." It is clear that the
Constitution contemplated that the Legislative Branch have plenary
control over the rights, duties, and responsibilities in the framework
of the Military Establishment, including regulations, procedures, and
remedies related to military discipline; and Congress and the courts
have acted in conformity with that view.37 1
Four years after Chappell, the Court restated this view in United States
v. Stanley,3 72 which presented one of the bleaker examples of govern-
mental mistreatment of its citizens. Stanley had been subjected to gov-
ernment LSD experiments, without his knowledge, while he served in
the United States Army.37 3 Years later, he sought money damages under
the Federal Tort Claims Act and under the Civil Rights Act. The Court
held that Stanley could not recover damages because Congress had not
created such a remedy.37 4 In its holding, the Court acknowledged that
Clause 14 provides an explicit grant of power to Congress over the
armed forces, and stated that, "What is distinctive here is the specificity
of that technically superfluous grant of power, and the insistence (evi-
dent from the number of Clauses devoted to the subject) with which the
Constitution confers authority over the Army, Navy, and militia upon
the political branches. 375
Finally, in Loving v. United States,3 7 6 its most recent case bearing
on military law, the Court reaffirmed its historical view that Clause 14 is
a plenary grant of power. In so doing, the Court compared Congress'
power to its other powers under Article I of the Constitution, finding
Clause 14 no less plenary a grant. 377 Thus, Congress' power under
371. Id. at 300-01 (citation omitted). The Court quoted this language from Chappell with
approval in Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 177 (1994), where the Court held that current
court-martial procedure was not unconstitutional even though military judges did not have a fixed
term of office and were not given a special presidential appointment as a military judge. The court
held that military judges' appointments as commissioned officers by the President satisfied the
Appointments Clause. See id. at 176.
372. 483 U.S. 669 (1987).
373. See id. at 671.
374. See id. at 682-84.
375. See id. at 682 (footnote omitted).
376. 116 S. Ct. 1737 (1996).
377. See id. at 1748 ("This power [under Clause 14] is no less plenary than other Article I
powers, and we discern no reasons why Congress should have less capacity to make measured and
appropriate delegations of this power than of any other.") (citations omitted).
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
Clause 14 is no different than its tax power,37 8 its commerce power,379 or
its power to coin money. 3
8 °
Of course, comparing Clause 14 to other Article I powers opens a
completely different can of worms. Although Congress has a plenary
power over commerce, the courts have a role in determining whether a
particular statute is within that commerce power. If a statute is in fact
regulating commerce, the inquiry ends. However, if the courts deter-
mine that a law enacted under Congress' commerce power does not reg-
ulate interstate commerce, then the courts are more than willing to strike
down that law. 38 ' Thus, to say that Clause 14 is a plenary power does
nothing more than establish that the courts may not strike down a con-
gressional regulation, as being outside Congress' Article I powers, so
long as it is in fact a regulation of the land and naval forces. 382  This
raises the question of when court-martial regulations fall within the
scope of regulation of the "land and naval forces," and when such regu-
lations fall outside that grant of power. The answers to these questions
lie in a series of cases in which the Court passed on the personal juris-
diction which courts-martial may exercise.
D. The Personal Jurisdiction Cases
The preceding discussion identified a great number of cases in
which the Supreme Court explicitly deferred to congressional policy
decisions in regard to the armed forces. The Court has acquiesced in the
creation of a separate First Amendment jurisprudence within the mili-
tary,3 83 a different due process analysis, 38 4 as well as an inferior right to
bring certain civil suits.385 The Court has also gone out of its way to
characterize Congress' power over the armed forces as plenary.386 In
fact, based on the foregoing sections, it might seem that Congress and
the President have carte blanche in establishing a court-martial system.
378. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
379. See id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
380. See id. art. I, § 8, cl. 5.
381. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1626 (1995) (striking down the Gun-
Free School Zones Act of 1990 as being outside Congress's Commerce Clause powers).
382. Of course, the courts will also strike down a law if it falls within Clause 14, but violates
some other constitutional provision. This Article, however, asserts only that it is within the
breadth of Clause 14 to create court-martial jurisdiction over death penalty offenses, whether
service-connected or not. Beyond that, of course, Congress must ensure that its procedures comply
with the other pertinent provisions of the Constitution.
383. See supra notes 304-10 and accompanying text.
384. See Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 177-78 (1994) (holding that due process test for
military regulations is "whether the factors militating in favor" of the servicemember's position
"are so extraordinarily weighty as to overcome the balance struck by Congress").
385. See supra notes 297-303 and accompanying text.
386. See supra notes 344-75 and accompanying text.
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That view might very well be correct, and justifiable in light of the
language of Clause 14, with one prominent exception. The one area
where the Court has evinced discomfort with the court-martial system is
the area of personal jurisdiction. Other than O'Callahan (the since-
overruled case establishing the service-connection test) the only cases
where the Court has had any inclination to meddle in congressional reg-
ulation of courts-martial has been when Congress has attempted to
impose martial or military law on civilians.
As far back as 1866, the Court distinguished the rights of civilian
defendants with those of soldiers in Ex parte Milligan.387 In that case,
the Court held that the military commission that sentenced Milligan to
death for treason was unconstitutional because Milligan had been denied
the right to a grand jury and to a jury of his peers.388 The Court noted
that soldiers did not have these procedural rights, but that this was part
and parcel of military service.3 89 The Framers determined that military
exigencies demanded that courts-martial be permitted to act without
these procedural niceties, and Congress had not created such a right
through statutory law.39° Milligan, however, was not a soldier, and there
was no justification for denying him his Fifth and Sixth Amendment
rights on the grounds of military exigency.391 This difference between
citizen and soldier was summed up by the Court twenty-four years after
Milligan in United States v. Grimley:392  "By enlistment the citizen
becomes a soldier. His relations to the State and the public are changed.
He acquires a new status, with correlative rights and duties ....
Milligan and Grimley, while touching tangentially on the issue of
courts-martial and personal jurisdiction, foreshadowed the series of per-
sonal jurisdiction cases that would erupt in the 1950's and 1960's. With
enactment of the UCMJ in 1950, Congress sought to greatly expand the
personal jurisdiction of courts-martial. 394 Discharged soldiers, govern-
ment employees working overseas, and dependents living overseas were
swept within the jurisdiction of courts-martial. The Court's rejection of
387. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
388. See id. at 122-23.
389. See id. at 123.
390. Id.
391. Id.
392. 137 U.S. 147 (1890).
393. Id. at 152; see also Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 324 (1946) (holding
unconstitutional the establishment of military tribunals in Hawaii during World War II to try
civilians for common-law crimes). The Duncan Court made the point to differentiate between the
rights of soldiers and those of civilians: "Both cases thus involve the rights of individuals charged
with crime and not connected with the armed forces to have their guilt or innocence determined in
courts of law which provide established procedural safeguards, rather than by military tribunals
which fail to afford many of these safeguards." Id. at 307 (emphasis added).
394. See supra notes 134-49 and accompanying text.
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this new jurisdiction was fast and furious. In striking down this
expanded jurisdiction, the Court for the first time set out to define the
meaning of the term "land and naval Forces" as that phrase is used in
Clause 14. In holding that Clause 14 did not permit Congress to create
court-martial jurisdiction over discharged soldiers, the Court stated in
United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles395 that "the power 'To make Rules'
to regulate 'the land and naval Forces' would seem to restrict court-
martial jurisdiction to persons who are actually members or part of the
armed forces." '39 6 In Reid v. Covert,3 97 the Court held that Congress
could not subject civilian dependents to trial by court-martial. 39' As in
Toth, the plurality in Covert relied on the plain language of Clause 14,
holding that it did not give Congress the power to try civilians by court-
martial: "The term 'land and naval Forces' refers to persons who are
members of the armed services and not to their civilian wives, children
and other dependents. 399
Although the language employed by the Covert plurality-that
Clause 14 only granted Congress the power to create court-martial juris-
diction over actual servicemembers-seemed to bode ill for court-mar-
tial jurisdiction over any civilians, at the time that was no certainty. The
reason for this confusion was that the Covert plurality was just that, a
plurality. Two Justices concurred in the judgment solely on the grounds
that Covert was a capital case; thus, only four Justices had adopted the
view that Clause 14 permitted jurisdiction only over actual ser-
vicemembers. 4°° The uncertainty ended in 1960 when the Court issued
three opinions striking down all court-martial jurisdiction over civilian
employees and dependents. In Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Single-
ton,4" 1 the Court held that Congress could not create court-martial juris-
diction over civilian dependents for non-capital offenses.4 "2 The
Singleton Court expressly adopted the statement of the Covert plurality
that the language "land and naval Forces" in Clause 14 gave Congress
the power to create court-martial jurisdiction over only persons actually
in the armed forces. 4 3 Because civilian dependents were not part of the
land and naval forces, they were not amenable to court-martial jurisdic-
tion, regardless of the severity of their crime.4" That view was rein-
395. 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
396. Id. at 15.
397. 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (plurality opinion).
398. Id. at 19-29.
399. Id.
400. See id. at 41 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); id. at 65 (Harlan, J., concurring).
401. 361 U.S. 234 (1960).
402. See id. at 249.
403. See id. at 240.
404. See id. at 242-43.
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forced in the companion cases of McElroy v. United States ex rel.
Guagliardo4 °5 and Grisham v. Hagan,4 °6 each holding that Congress
could not constitutionally create court-martial jurisdiction over civilian
government employees for capital or non-capital offenses.4 °7
The personal jurisdiction cases are important because they forced
the Court to define Congress' power under Clause 14. In those cases,
the Court firmly established that the term "land and naval Forces" within
Clause 14 referred to people, not organizations. Therefore, Congress
could not justify court-martial jurisdiction over civilians by asserting
that the jurisdiction related to their regulation of the military. Thus,
when Clause 14 grants Congress the power to regulate the land and
naval forces, it grant Congress the power to create court-martial jurisdic-
tion over a class of people, active duty members of the armed forces.
The Court said as much in Ex parte Quirin,401 a case considering consti-
tutional claims made by Nazi spies tried by military commission:
The exception from the Amendments of "cases arising in the land or
naval forces" was not aimed at trials by military tribunals, without a
jury, of such offenses against the law of war. Its objective was quite
different-to authorize the trial by court martial of the members of
our Armed Forces for all that class of crimes which under the Fifth
and Sixth Amendments might otherwise have been deemed triable in
the civil courts. The cases mentioned in the exception are not
restricted to those involving offenses against the law of war alone,
but extend to trial of all offenses, including crimes which were of the
class traditionally triable by jury at common law.40 9
This view is quite consistent with the Court's willingness to acquiesce to
congressional decisions regarding court-martial procedure, so long as
that procedure applies only to servicemembers. When Congress or the
President has sought to subject civilians to courts-martial or to military
commissions, the Court has stepped into the fray. Chief Justice Warren
made this very point in an influential law review article entitled The Bill
of Rights and the Military.410 In that article, Warren contrasted the
Court's involvement in Congress' regulation of servicemembers under
its war powers and in Congress' attempts to regulate civilians under
those same powers:
So far as the relationship of the military to its own personnel is
concerned, the basic attitude of the Court has been that the [Supreme
405. 361 U.S. 281 (1960).
406. 361 U.S. 278 (1960).
407. See McElroy, 361 U.S. at 283-84; Grisham, 361 U.S. at 280.
408. 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
409. Id. at 43 (emphasis added).
410. Warren, supra note 321, at 181.
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Court's] jurisdiction is most limited .... The cases in which the
Court has ordered the release of persons convicted by courts martial
have, to date, been limited to instances in which it found lack of
military jurisdiction over the person so tried, using the term "jurisdic-
tion" in its narrowest sense. That is, they were all cases in which the
defendant was found to be such that he was not constitutionally, or
statutorily, amenable to military justice. Such was the classic formu-
lation of the relation between civil courts and courts martial as
expressed in Dynes v. Hoover, decided in 1857.
This "hands off' attitude has strong historical support, of course.
While I cannot here explore the matter completely, there is also no
necessity to do so, since it is indisputable that the tradition of our
country, from the time of the Revolution until now, has supported the
military establishment's broad power to deal with its own personnel.
The most obvious reason is that courts are ill-equipped to determine
the impact upon discipline that any particular intrusion upon military
authority might have.4"'
Beyond establishing that the Clause 14 grant of power over the
"land and naval Forces" extends to all persons actually in the military,
the personal jurisdiction cases are important precedent on the very issue
raised by Justice Stevens in Loving-the constitutional significance of
death penalty cases under Clause 14. Recall that Justices Frankfurter
and Harlan concurred in Reid v. Covert only because Mrs. Covert was
on trial for a capital offense. Because the lead opinion, which did not
distinguish between capital and non-capital offenses, was the opinion of
only four Justices, it was unclear whether Congress' powers under
Clause 14 were less expansive in capital cases.41 2 In Singleton, the
Court tackled the very issue pressed by Justice Stevens in Loving, and
unanimously held that there was no constitutional distinction between
Congress' power to establish jurisdiction over capital offenses and its
power to do so for non-capital offenses.4 3 In Covert, the Government,
confident that non-capital jurisdiction was constitutional, argued that
Congress had the same power to set capital jurisdiction as non-capital
411. Id. at 186-87 (footnotes omitted).
412. See supra note 393 and accompanying text. In Covert, Justices Frankfurter and Harlan
were the only two of the eight Justices participating in the case to find a distinction between
capital and non-capital cases. The plurality opinion stated that Congress could not create court-
martial jurisdiction over civilian dependents. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1957)
(plurality opinion). The two dissenting Justices rejected such a constitutional distinction. See id.
at 89 (Clark, J., dissenting). Thus, the argument could be made that a majority of the Court in
Covert rejected the notion that there was a distinction between Congress' Clause 14 powers in
capital and non-capital cases, though the plurality and the dissenters disagreed sharply about the
extent of those powers. See Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960)
(discussing the various opinions in Reid v. Covert).
413. See Singleton, 361 U.S. at 243-46.
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jurisdiction.414
Singleton, however, was the reverse of Covert. Mrs. Dial, the pris-
oner at issue in Singleton, had been tried for a non-capital offense. The
Government reversed course from its Covert position and adopted the
view urged by Justices Frankfurter and Harlan in Covert. The Govern-
ment argued that the Court should permit jurisdiction over Mrs. Dial, a
dependent living overseas with her husband, because Congress' power
under Clause 14 was broader for non-capital offenses.4"5 The Court
rejected this position, and held that because Mrs. Dial was not part of the
"land and naval Forces," she could not be tried by court-martial, no mat-
ter what her alleged offense.416 In denying jurisdiction over Mrs. Dial,
the Court stated that "[t]he test for jurisdiction, it follows, is one of sta-
tus, namely, whether the accused in the court-martial proceeding is a
person who can be regarded as falling within the term 'land and naval
Forces.""'4 7 Directly confronting the premise that Congress' Clause 14
power depended on the nature of the offense, the Court stated:
Likewise in the Government's historical material-dealing with
court-martial jurisdiction during peace.., it has been unable to point
out one court-martial which drew any distinction, insofar as the grant
of power to the Congress under Clause 14 was concerned, between
capital and noncapital crimes .... Without contradiction, the materi-
als furnished show that military jurisdiction has always been based on
the "status" of the accused, rather than on the nature of the offense.
To say that military jurisdiction "defies definition in terms of military
'status' is to defy unambiguous language of art. I, § 8, cl. 14, as well
as the historical background thereof and the precedents with refer-
ence thereto.41 8
Thus, the issue raised by Justice Stevens in his Loving concurrence is
not one of first impression. The Court considered and rejected the argu-
ment that Clause 14 contains some hidden distinction between capital
and non-capital offenses. Before Justice Stevens wrote the four-Justice
concurrence in Loving, this distinction had never captured more than
two votes on the Court-those being Justices Frankfurter and Harlan in
Covert. Moreover, that view was repudiated unanimously by the Court
in Singleton. For that reason, Justice Stevens' view of Clause 14 cannot
prevail without directly overruling the Court's unanimous opinion in
Singleton, an opinion that found no distinction within Clause 14 between
capital and non-capital offenses.
414. See id. at 241-42 (characterizing the Government's position in Covert).
415. See id. at 242.
416. See id. at 246.
417. Id. at 240-41.
418. Id. at 242-43 (footnotes and citations omitted).
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V. CONCLUSION
As the foregoing analysis illustrates, Justice Stevens is mistaken in
his Loving concurrence when he asserts that Congress' power to fix the
death penalty jurisdiction of courts-martial is anything less than plenary.
The plain language of Clause 14 imposes no limits on Congress' power
in this area; nor does it suggest any constitutional distinction between
capital offenses and non-capital offenses. The Supreme Court has
repeatedly characterized Clause 14 as a plenary grant of power, to say
nothing of its repeated assertions that Congress, and not the courts, is to
be the primary arbiter of servicemembers' rights. Justice Stevens bases
his argument largely on historical practice, but evidence from the consti-
tutional era demonstrates that the Framers desired that regulation of the
armed forces evolve with changing times and exigencies. As the Court
put it in Solorio:
But such disapproval [of court-martial jurisdiction over common-law
crimes] in England at the time of William and Mary hardly proves
that the Framers of the Constitution, contrary to the plenary language
in which they conferred the power on Congress, meant to freeze
court-martial usage at a particular time in such a way that Congress
might not change it.4 19
Furthermore, even if that desir were not so plainly evident, there is
nothing in the historical materias to suggest that historical practice was
anything more than a series of policy choices, just as the current subject-
matter jurisdiction of courts-martial is a policy choice.
Nevertheless, while this Article has endeavored to provide an
understanding of what Clause 14 is, it is equally important to recognize
what Clause 14 is not. Clause 14 provides that Congress can create
whatever subject-matter jurisdiction for courts-martial that it sees fit.
That is not to say that the courts are without a role in overseeing the
court-martial process. The judiciary, as the final authority in constitu-
tional interpretation, must determine whether a particular statute falls
within the regulation of the "land and naval forces," as required by
Clause 14. The Supreme Court has spoken in this regard. The test is
whether the person regulated is part of the armed forces, such that he is
amenable to trial by court-martial. Once Congress passes that jurisdic-
tional hurdle, the courts have no place to second-guess the wisdom of
the subject-matter jurisdiction created by Congress.
Beyond enforcing the status test that governs Clause 14, the courts
have a second role in military justice matters. The Court of Military
Appeals held long ago that the Bill of Rights applies to courts-martial,
419. Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 446 (1987).
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excepting, of course, the indictment and jury rights of the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments.42° For example, if Congress were to make certain
types of larceny capital offenses under the UMCJ, it would be appropri-
ate for the judiciary to consider whether that would violate the Eighth
Amendment. But if the court-martial system itself passes constitutional
muster, the courts may not interfere with Congress' decision to allow
selected criminal offenses to be tried in that forum.
Having considered the proper roles for Congress and the judiciary
in setting and overseeing court-martial jurisdiction, the next question is
whether it really matters. The experience under the service-connection
test demonstrated that servicemembers were found to be amenable to
court-martial jurisdiction upon a very low threshold of service-connec-
tion.42' Thus, if Justice Stevens' view were to prevail, it is possible that
little would change in the death penalty jurisdiction of courts-martial.
There are, however, several reasons why it matters. First, if the rationale
of Justice Stevens' concurrence prevailed service-connection would be
an issue in practically every court-martial where the death penalty is
authorized. This is because the death penalty is almost never adjudged
for a purely military offense. Between 1942 and 1950, the armed forces
executed 148 servicemembers as a result of court-martial sentences.422
Of those cases, 106 were for murder, forty-one were for rape, and one
was for desertion in the face of the enemy. 423 The military just does not
execute many soldiers for disclosing the watch-word these days. Thus,
all the military's capital trials are destined to be for crimes cognizable by
civilian courts, which would make service-connection an important con-
sideration in each case if Justice Stevens' view were to prevail. Second,
the defense bar considers it a viable issue, ensuring future litigation. At
the death penalty defense class taught at the Naval Justice School, one of
the first classes is entitled, "Service Connection: The Resurrection of
O'Callahan?"42 4 Thus, we can expect the service-connection issue to be
raised at every capital trial until the Supreme Court settles the matter
420. See United States v. Jacoby, 29 C.M.R. 244, 246-47 (1960). In Loving, Justice Thomas
expressed an uncertainty as to whether the Bill of Rights applies to courts-martial. See Loving v.
United States, 116 S. Ct. 1737, 1753 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("It is not clear to me that the
extensive rules we have developed under the Eighth Amendment for the prosecution of civilian
capital cases, including the requirement of proof of aggravating factors, necessarily apply to
capital prosecutions in the military, and this Court has never so held.") (citations omitted). It
seems highly unlikely that such a view will ever command a majority of the Court.
421. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
422. See John T. Willis, The United States Court of Military Appeals: Its Origin, Operation
and Future, 55 MIL. L. REv. 39, 40 n.4 (1972).
423. See id.
424. See NJS Death Penalty Defense Seminar Syllabus, Sept. 16-18, 1996 class (on file with
author).
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once and for all.425
As of April of 1997, there were ten servicemembers on the mili-
tary's death row. Not surprisingly, all are there for murder. It seems
likely that each of their crimes would be service-connected under the
permissive standard that preceded Solorio, but some are closer cases
than others.426 Nevertheless, the availability of the death penalty in the
military can lead to some very unseemly practices, even when the
accuseds facing the death penalty are generally tried for crimes at least
425. This process has already begun. See Defense Motion to Dismiss for Deprivation of the
Right to Presentment and Indictment Before a Grand Jury (Oct. 16, 1996), United States v.
Quintanilla (on file with author). In Quintanilla, the defense demanded a grand jury indictment,
citing Justice Stevens' concurrence in Loving. Quintanilla was convicted in November 1996 of
murdering his Executive Officer and wounding his Commanding Officer while they were in their
on-base offices, during the work day. At the time of the offenses, Sergeant Quintanilla was
wearing his Marine Corps-issued coveralls, and the evidence suggested that the murders were
motivated by what the accused perceived as unfair treatment by his superiors. The raising of a
service-connection challenge in Quintanilla demonstrates that the defense bar has accepted Justice
Stevens' invitation to pursue this issue, though they might not be particularly discerning in
selecting appropriate cases in which to raise it.
426. Army Sergeant William Kreutzer, Jr. murdered an officer from his own unit during a
sniper attack at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. See generally Nick Adde, Ruling Clears Way for
Execution, NAVY TiMEs (MARINE CORPS ED.), July 1, 1996, at 16. Marine Lance Corporal
Kenneth Park and Private First Class Wade Walker murdered two Marines just outside Camp
Lejeune, North Carolina. Id. Air Force Senior Airman Jose Simoy murdered a fellow base
security policeman at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam. The victim was an escort for a bank
deposit by a commissary employee. Id. Marine Sergeant Jessie Quintanilla murdered his
Executive Officer. See Tony Perry, Marine Held in Officer's Slaying, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1996,
at A3. Marine Lance Corporal Ronnie Curtis murdered his lieutenant and his lieutenant's wife at
the lieutenant's home on board Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. See United States v. Curtis, 44
M.J. 106, 117 (C.A.A.F. 1996). Marine Sergeant Joseph Thomas murdered his wife in their home
aboard Marine Corps Air Station Tustin, California. See United States v. Thomas, 43 M.J. 550,
564 (N.M.C.C.A. 1995). Significant parts of the planning of the murder occurred on board
Marine Corps Air Station, El Toro, California. See id. at 563-64. Private Dwight Loving
murdered two cab drivers on and near Fort Hood, Texas. See United States v. Loving, 41 M.J.
213, 229 (C.A.A.F. 1994), aff'd, 116 S. Ct. 1737 (1996). One of the cab drivers was an active
duty soldier and the other was a retired soldier. See id. Army Specialist Ronald Gray raped and
murdered two women near Fort Bragg. See United States v. Gray, 37 M.J. 730, 736 (A.C.M.R.
1992). One of the victims was a private in the Army. See id. Army Sergeant James Murphy
murdered his estranged wife, her five year-old son, and their infant son in Mrs. Murphy's
Mannheim, Germany apartment. See United States v. Murphy, 36 M.J. 1137, 1140-41 (A.C.M.R.
1993). Clearly, the murders committed by Kreutzer, Parker, Walker, Simoy, Curtis, Thomas,
Loving, and Quintanilla would be service-connected. Gray's offenses are a much closer call. One
of his victims was an army private, and the crimes occurred near Gray's base. See Gray, 37 M.J.
at 730. But the second murder was of a civilian, and Gray was tried and convicted of two
additional murders committed during the same general time frame in civilian court. See id. at 733
n.1. Murphy's murders might be service-connected merely because they occurred overseas. See
supra note 159. The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces recently reversed the death sentence
adjudged to Lance Corporal Curtis and Sergeant Thomas. Their convictions of death-eligible
murder offenses remain undisturbed. Thus, the fate of these two accuseds is uncertain, pending
resentencing hearings. See United States v. Curtis, 46 M.J. 129 (C.A.A.F. 1997); United States v.
Thomas, 46 M.J. 311 (C.A.A.F. 1997).
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somewhat service-connected. On June 3, 1996, the Honolulu, Hawaii
police found the decomposed body of Marine Lance Corporal Juan
Guerrero. He had been shot in the head. Four Marines were arrested for
the murder. Eventually, the four suspects were turned over to the mili-
tary for trial. The Navy Times reported the turnover to the military as
follows: "Honolulu City Prosecutor Keith Kaneshiro has agreed to let
the military try the four Marines because Corps officials have assured
him they will seek the death penalty ... . It is the thesis of this
article that the military was free to seek the death penalty on these
Marines because of their status, whether their alleged crimes were ser-
vice-connected or not. But that does not mean the military should exer-
cise jurisdiction just because it can. Hawaii does not have the death
penalty, and the fact that the suspects are Marines allows Hawaiian offi-
cials to avoid their own law and have these cases before a capital forum.
As unfortunate as that state of affairs might be, the culprit assuredly is
not the permissive jurisdiction of courts-martial. Even if Justice Ste-
vens' view were to prevail, these suspects would be in the same situa-
tion. The facts appear to be that the four Marines conspired to kill a fifth
Marine. The offense, in all likelihood, occurred somewhat near their
military base, and the conspiracy may have originated there. Thus, this
case is as service-connected as Loving, a case Justice Stevens found
passed the O'Callahan test. The potential gamesmanship of dual sover-
eigns would exist under either situation, and can be solved only by the
exercise of wise discretion.428 In the end, the Marine Corps agreed not
to seek the death penalty in return for guilty pleas.429 Perhaps this deci-
sion was in part attributable to the exercise of discretion necessary in
any dual sovereign situation.
Some might read this article and find the limited role of the judici-
ary in overseeing courts-martial disconcerting. It must be remembered,
however, that the thesis of this article is not that servicemembers have
no recourse against what they perceive as unfairness within the military
427. 4 Marines Accused of Killing Another, NAVY TIMES (MARINE CORPS ED.), June 24, 1996,
at 2.
428. Forum shopping in light of overlapping sovereigns is not a new phenomenon in criminal
law, and is not limited to the military context. Before the Supreme Court applied the exclusionary
rule to the states in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), it was not uncommon for federal agents to
pass the fruits of an illegal search to state authorities, who could avoid the exclusionary rule by
trying the case in state court. More recently, this practice, known as the "silver platter doctrine,"
has given way to the "reverse silver platter doctrine," whereby state agents can avoid expansive
rights granted by state constitutions by passing the case to federal officials, who can try the case in
federal court, without regard to state evidentiary rules. See generally James W. Diehm, New
Federalism and Constitutional Criminal Procedure: Are We Repeating the Mistakes of the Past?,
55 MD. L. REv. 223 (1996).
429. See Letter from Major L.S. Powell to author (June 16, 1997) (on file with author).
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justice system; rather, it is that the primary guarantor of ser-
vicemembers' rights is Congress and not the courts. Congress has
proven, time and time again, that it is receptive to the clarion call for
reform. The 1920 amendments to the Articles of War came after
soldiers returning from the First World War complained about inequities
in the military justice system.4 30 The passage of the UCMJ was another
example of Congress heeding the public's call for an overhaul of courts-
martial.431 Congress mandated warnings about the right against self-
incrimination before the Supreme Court required the same of civil-
ians.432 In Goldman v. Weinberger,433 the Supreme Court held that the
Air Force could prevent a Jewish chaplain from wearing a yarmulke in
uniform.4 34 Congress stepped in and passed legislation overruling the
Air Force regulation at issue in Goldman.435
This article has not attempted any sort of broad defense of the mili-
tary justice system. The reason is that this article is concerned with
whether Congress can create court-martial jurisdiction over non-service-
connected capital offenses. The question of whether the court-martial
system Congress has created is constitutional is a matter for the judici-
ary. Assuming that the current system is constitutional, it is for Con-
gress to decide whether the system itself is defensible from a moral
standpoint, and to make changes if they are desirable. But it is interest-
ing to note that in many ways, Congress has been a more progressive
guarantor of servicemembers' rights than the judiciary. The judiciary is
concerned with whether the military can enforce a particular regulation,
not with whether the regulation is a good idea. Because the Constitution
vests such decisions in the political branches, the courts invariably find
military regulations well within the discretion of those two branches.
Congress, on the other hand, is the body that determines not whether it
can enact military legislation, but whether it should. Thus, complaints
that courts-martial may impose the death penalty for non-service-con-
nected offenses should be directed to Congress, and not to the courts.
The Constitution surely permits such courts-martial. Congress can cre-
ate, and has created, court-martial jurisdiction over capital offenses
without regard to whether they are service-connected. Whether Con-
430. See Wiener, supra note 129, at 21-22.
431. See Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140 (1953) (plurality opinion).
432. Compare Act of May 5, 1950, ch. 169, art. 31, 64 Stat. 107, 118 (requiring warnings
about the right to remain silent) with Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (creating a similar
rule for civilian law enforcement officers).
433. 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
434. See id. at 509-10.
435. Act of Dec. 4, 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-180, § 508, 101 Stat. 1019, 1086 (codified as 10
U.S.C. § 774 (1994)); see also Dwight H. Sullivan, The Congressional Response to Goldman v.
Weinberger, 121 MIL. L. REV. 125 (1988).
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gress will continue to authorize such courts-martial is a question for
Congress alone to decide, with appropriate input from the American
people.
